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Abstract
This contribution proposes a new index of cultural activities in Europe,
for the period 800-1800. In order to test it, a novel dataset is constructed
by joining two works of Murray [2003] and Bosker et al. [2013] which are
complemented with an additional set of original data. The index mea-
sures the degree of cultural activity of a region at city level by counting
the number of high achieving innovators clustering in it. In this way a
map of innovation across Europe can be produced and a series of his-
torical hypotheses can be assessed. Emerging properties of persistence
and diffusion of talent are observed. A series of regression analyses are
implemented to test for alternative theories about the influence of cul-
ture. In particular, the so called “Industrial Enlightenment” is put into
question. It holds that the ideals stemming from the scientific revolution
of the XVII century, European positivism and the political experience of
XVIII century’s French intellectuals, contributed in a determinant way
to the industrial revolution by interacting with the English intellectual
and productive system. This view is compared with some alternative
theories. The results of the analysis do not allow for a refusal of the
cultural hypothesis for the industrial revolution: the role of France, and
in particular Paris, as the pulsing hearth of European innovation is con-
firmed by the data. Moreover, England is more active in the fields of
invention than France before and for much of the industrial revolution.
Other historical impressions concerning intellectual activities in Europe
are confirmed and indicate a good reliability of the index.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When we represent civilisations and diverse periods of history, we tend to identify
them by their long-standing contributions and characteristic peculiarities in both
the material and intellectual sphere of human activity. By this very process of sepa-
ration and systematisation, we can insulate some coordinates that allow us to recall
and compare different realities, which would otherwise be similar to one another in
many ways. The accumulation of some atypical and novel elements in the different
activity’s spheres assumed to catalogue history, ends up being conventionally em-
phasised as a “revolution”, such that new “eras” or “periods” begin: we consider
the world to be no longer the same. This division however, by its very ex post na-
ture, is somehow arbitrary and separates in phases what is continuous in itself. This
continuity is rooted in previous events and path dependent phenomena; it rarely
acts abruptly but works by shocks and slow growth processes. The industrial rev-
olution in this sense is no exception. Few economic historians would now deny its
gradual emergence as a cumulative phenomenon, invisible to many at the time it
was unravelling its potential, but at the end of the process so pervasive it changed
the very face of what we consider the western world and its position in the globe.
To account for such a process is certainly one fundamental quest for historians and,
specifically, for economic historians. Many theories have been proposed, going from
the materialist up to the more philosophical and detached, yet no consensus has
emerged. The debate is still open, and numerous recent contributions have clar-
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ified and broadened the discussion, emphasising what certainly are core elements
of the grand puzzle. Some scholars have concentrated their attention on England,
as the first country that has “experienced” the industrial revolution. Among the
various narratives proposed, one interesting thesis about the roots of the industrial
revolution concerns the role of culture in having helped or even laid the basis for
it. In particular, the Enlightenment as both a scientific and cultural movement is
considered in some eminent interpretations to be the reason underpinning industri-
alisation: new ideas and practices diffused into England and continental Europe to
a degree that conformed production and innovation to a new paradigm, which soon
proved itself to be highly effective.
This work resorts to a new dataset to capture the factors influencing the cultural
life of Europe in the period 800-1800. The dataset is the result of the joining of two
studies by Murray [2003] and Bosker et al. [2013], which I have complemented with
a series of additional details. Much of the analytical effort of the next chapters is
focused on understanding the relationship between urban indicators and a series of
pivotal historical figures selected for their contribution to the cultural development
of Europe. They are inventors, musicians, scientists or artists usually associated to
the grand achievements of western civilisation and held as exemplary of a broader
mass of cultural actors. In particular, we aim at understanding the factors influenc-
ing the birth and migration of eminent people, which is confronted with the historical
evidence of the time in order to verify whether the geography and demography of
genius supports or contradicts the thesis of the cultural origin of European indus-
trialisation. By doing this, a series of interesting properties emerge, which seem
consistent with the cultural accounts of the industrial revolution. Additionally, they
portray an interesting map of talent in pre-industrial Europe.
The first chapter deals in detail with two general approaches to the causes of
the industrial revolution, showing the strengths and weaknesses of each account.
They are the theoretical backbone for the interpretation of the subsequent parts of
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the discussion, and serve as reference for the evidence that emerges in the following
chapters. The final part of this chapter explores the reasons behind the choice of high
achieving innovators in culture as an index of broader cultural activity in Europe
for the period 800-1800.
Chapter two and three illustrate in detail the sources and methodology used to
construct the dataset.
Chapter four is divided in three sections: the first one collects and interprets a series
of tables and maps illustrating the evolution of cultural geography across time. The
second part is concerned with some tables of regression analysis emphasising the
institutional factors that matter across time for the concentration and development
of talent. In this way the results can be confronted with those interpretations of
history that stress the importance of institutions in influencing innovation. Finally,
the third part elaborates on the findings and proposes some potential interpretations
of the main results of the study.
3
Chapter 2
Industrial Enlightenment and the
Role of Culture
The industrial revolution was a glorious time of human history, which literally
started an exponential growth in every sector of human activity. The diverse hy-
potheses concerning its causes can be reduced to two major views concerning Eng-
land and Europe in the period 1700 to 1850, for which a somehow paradoxical
picture emerges. In fact, England is usually seen at the same time as the first lucky
prototype of what came later (so that other countries should have really cared about
the Marxian “de fabula te narratur !”), and the Promethean force which sole could
free and did free Europe from its Malthusian condition. The paradox lies in the fact
that the first account reduces in part what we might label as “English exceptional-
ism”, claiming that other countries were capable of reaching what England reached
and that they would have followed the same path sooner or later, independently of
the fate England. The second one points to some well-tuned combination of factors
we observe as the key to understanding the insurgence of the industrial revolution,
which could not have been met easily in other parts of Europe: these are structural
and usually related to the institutional and market asset of the country. Naturally,
to a certain degree the two can coexists: England was somehow favoured by her
“virtues” in its access to the benefits of industrialisation, but it was the progeny of
its time too and it absorbed the European mass of ideas and practices that coalesced
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into a favourable milieu for gradual industrialisation and innovation.
The two extreme views that I have exemplified are, of course, oversimplifying and
should not be taken too seriously. Yet they cast some light on the general trend
we can observe in the literature. On one side we find some scholars advocating
cultural and sociological reasons for the origin of the industrial revolution, such as
McCloskey [2010] and Mokyr [2005]; on the other, some accounts focus on the ma-
terial and institutional factors, such as Allen [2009], Broadberry and Gupta [2009]
and North and Weingast [1989].
The merit of the second kind of accounts is that the authors that opt for them
limit themselves to specific segments of the economy, making their main contribution
clear. However, they are vulnerable in reason of their own virtue: they can hardly
survive the confrontation with similar realities, which show that some factors were
not unique to England; nor can they avoid the scrupulous qualification of a given
reality, which reduce the reach of their claims. The first group of authors, at the
contrary, points to some broad and usually neglected pervasive factors of develop-
ment, of institutional and social nature. They consider intangibles, such as ideas and
social conventions, to be fundamental in giving account for the pre-eminence (if not
uniqueness) of England and Europe in having developed (by chance and intuition)
the right set of cultural and economic tools leading toward industrialisation. At a
higher level, these factors are important in describing economies in the long run, in
the line of Acemoglu et al. [2005] or North [1990], but with a wider definition of
what an institution is in terms of its evolutionary capabilities.1
1To cite North’s definition of an institution: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In
consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic.”
[North, 1990, p.3]. The pioneering study by Douglas North opened up the way to a series of
fundamental contributions in the field of economics and its cognate disciplines, which tried to
capture the effects of subtle institutional effects over long-term development. What is proposed in
the next sections should be read in light of the literature on institutions.
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2.1 Mokyr’s contribution on Enlightenment
The arguments who emphasise the interplay between the history of ideas and the
history of things find a strong advocate in Joel Mokyr who, in a series of key works,
has outlined a compelling argument for the reasons of “why Britain” and, to a ma-
jor extent, “why Europe”. The central idea of his works is that in order to account
for the industrial revolution, we need to insulate the paradigm shift that made it
possible, which in his opinion is the result of the fusion between the enlightened
ideals preceding the French revolution and the Baconian program on science which
imbued English society.1 His arguments usually come in the monographic form,
with complementary articles declining some aspects. Monographies are useful both
for their ample discussion of the period preceding and contingent to the industrial
revolution, and for the rich details of historical nature and tests which constitute
a conspicuous pars destruens against other theories. For example, Mokyr presents
a series of arguments against the “high-wage thesis” for the improvement in tech-
nology and innovation for the British economy in 1700-1850 (which has in Allen
[2009] and Broadberry and Gupta [2009] some strong voices). He aims at showing
that innovation is neither a direct consequence of an incentive for the adoption of
an already existing basic machinery, nor of abundant raw materials.2 The true force
behind the wave of new machines and procedures that flowed through Britain and
Europe in the XVIII-XIX centuries, is not to be found in the economy alone, but
rather in the ideas and values that interacted with it. These ideas are those of
the enlightenment, and have reshaped an already favourable England trough many
channels, that gradually moulded the country to make it receptive up to the point we
can speak about an “Industrial Enlightenment”, that is an industrialisation which
has no reason to exist if devoid of its enlightened (material) contents.
1“The three “C’s”— counting, classifying, cataloguing—were central to the Baconian program
that guided much of the growth of useful knowledge in the century before the Industrial Revolution”
[Mokyr, 2005, p. 289].
2“The difficulty with a theory that attributes technological change to the cost of fuel relative
to that of labour is that fuel costs are not exogenous. [. . . ] The low price of coal, rather than being
a cause of the Industrial Revolution, was very much a consequence of it.” [Mokyr, 2009, p.270]
and also “Apart from a short period during the Napoleonic Wars, there is little evidence that
technological change in Britain as a whole was on balance labor-saving machinery before 1830”
[Mokyr, 2009, p.271].
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Enlightened ideals were responsible for several modification in the economy, the
scientific community and the laws affecting trade and property. This came not
only as indirect contamination, but also as part of the very agenda of illuminists.
From the institutional side, ideals loyal to the mercantilist positions that permeated
England were removed either in reason of the ideals of an open economy, rooted
in the search for international “enlightened” cooperation and based on mutualism,
or rather because of the more realist aversion toward institutions that favoured
rent-seekers. This, coupled with a culture encouraging profit, boosted a series of
institutional innovations favourable to the abolitions of many barriers to trade and
capital accumulation [Mokyr, 2009, p.69]. From the point of view of science, the
presence of a vast group of skilled craftsmen, as well as a quasi-middleclass, was
a crucial step. Vast parts of the active society, according to Mokyr, absorbed the
thirst for knowledge of the time, and applied a rudimental but extensive system-
atisation which contributed to the understanding of phenomena whose mechanics
were not yet known. Several scientific societies (formal and informal) enhanced the
quality of knowledge at the time, by disseminating ideas and founding institutions
capable of doing that. In Mokyr’s view, this favoured the optimisation and search
of new alternatives in the production sector, while at the same time predisposing
society toward new advancements and a co-creation of them.1 This very aspect of
the interaction between different parts of society, the higher scientific and technical
world, whose fortune came also from chance and luck, and the anonymous but con-
stant mass of minor contributors to the Industrial Enlightenment, is what probably
set apart England from its counterparts [Mokyr, 2009, pp. 140-144]. France, for
example, who should be the most natural candidate for the industrial revolution,
was severely stressed by its Napoleonic phase (in term of wars and institutional tur-
moil, for example in property security) and the new centralised institutions which
separated the pure sciences from production and firms. If we accept this narrative,
1“Yet the Enlightenment was successful because beneath the giants operated a much larger con-
tingent of scientific writers, tinkerers, engineers, lecturers, machinists, and experimental philoso-
phers, who may not have been quite in the class of a Joseph Priestly, a John Dalton, or a Michel
Faraday, but who could stand on the giant’s shoulders.” [Mokyr, 2009, p.88].
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continental Europe was a rather unstable place to be, while England had enjoyed
stability since the Glorious Revolution.
2.1.1 Useful Knowledge
So far we spoke of knowledge in general terms. However, the kind of knowledge
Mokyr has in mind is defined in a more precise way. It is in fact “useful knowledge”
to matter in the context of the Industrial Enlightenment. A simple definition of it,
is that useful knowledge is of the genus that matters for material life: it contributes
to the capacity of physical transformation and procedural organisation of men. The
Industrial Revolution is a direct consequence of a diffuse attitude toward discovery,
it defines a method for its spreading and consultation, combined with a practical
and production oriented attitude. The attitudes that define it are all born from
the marriage between the enlightened ideals coming from France and continental
Europe, and the Baconian program rooted in the English intellectual community.
In Mokyr’s narrative, an inclusive, stable, and slowly but stubbornly growing soci-
ety, as that of XVIII century England, was the best niche for the evolution toward
Industrialisation. For it was comparatively better as environment for the spreading
of new ideas and the accumulation of useful knowledge at different levels. The con-
nective system of craftsmen, artisans and scientists that was presents in cities and
smaller towns in England, is the true silent army behind the accumulation of new
useful knowledge [Mokyr, 2009, p.116].
Other elements of Enlightenment have eliminated barriers to the development of
the necessary scientific and practical outlook over production for a successful and
stable industrialisation. The first one is the process of standardisation. We already
introduced it as the idea of a shared attitude toward how to catalogue phenomena
and what we expressed as a shared agenda for scientific research. This is rather a
consequence of standardisation: part of the evolution of the Baconian project. It
required the setting of shared languages and goals who would have greatly benefited
the advancement of knowledge. The point is that standardisation was an improve-
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ment to the accessibility of useful knowledge, which in turn is necessary for the
Industrial Enlightenment. In a sense, it is the key to systematic industrialisation:
the sharing of best practices, of technologies, and the development of new ones.1
An important note regards the so called epistemic base, that is the understand-
ing of the “how does something happen?” and its principles. According to Mokyr
the common wisdom of the time was not too concerned with it as long as come
properties of things, with potential applications, could be insulated and considered
reliable. This is the time of cataloguing and statistical tables, of machines whose
physical laws where sometimes not fully understood, or of medicines whose chem-
ical principle was unknown, but therapeutic potential evident [Mokyr, 2002, p.91].
Finally, what set the period of 1700-1850 apart from past tides of innovation (such
as those of the Renaissance) was its capability of self-sustaining them: we see no
longer some punctual innovations but rather broad and coordinated efforts toward
new techniques, new products, which go up in a virtuous spiral of development and
growth [Mokyr, 2002, pp.244 ss].
2.1.2 Clark’s critique
There are however many limitations to the story told so far. A good critique of the
limits of the accounts of the Industrial Revolution based on culture is given by Clark
[2012]. The difficulties that Clark finds in Mokyr’s narrative are:
1. The fact that the movement of Enlightenment is European, yet Industrialisa-
tion is British;
2. There is no precise dating for the Enlightenment and its roots are in the mid
of the XVII century;2
3. Innovators and innovations of the industrial revolution seem not to be the
1Language and the reduction of barriers in access to useful knowledge are well expressed in
[Mokyr, 2002, pp.58-73].
2“In all historical discussion, time tends to be compressed, and events that were actually remote
in time get merged. An Enlightenment dated to 1637, or 1660, would have begun 100-130 years,
3-4 generations, before the Industrial Revolution. That is too long a gap to have any plausible
causal role.”[Clark, 2012, p.10].
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fruits of scholarly works and their focus is on petty improvements by craftsmen
rather than cultured people.
4. How can we distinguish between theories of culture? In particular between
Mokyr [2009] and McCloskey [2010]?1
Other weaknesses are minor in force and not worth reporting here. Clark then goes
to the point:
“There is a fundamental problem with the approach of Mokyr to these
difficult causal questions [. . . ] the lack of serious quantitative evaluation
of his hypothesis [. . . ] This book offers interesting stories of the fascina-
tion of people with science in the eighteenth century, and proof in the
form of the extravagant amounts they were willing to pay for scientific
lectures and demonstrations.” - [Clark, 2012, p.12], italics are mine.
What is more, testing of hypotheses is difficult for multilevel analyses rich in sug-
gestions but difficult to insulate in core determinants, as Clark notes:
“Mokyr makes testing for causality all the more difficult by an arguing
that the Enlightenment created multiple paths towards faster efficiency
advance. [. . . ] The point of the Cliometric Revolution in economics was
to work towards a testable scientific history. Mokyr’s re-embrace of this
earlier casual mode of history, however richly illustrated his story, and
however deep his erudition, puts us on the wrong path.” - [Clark, 2012,
p.13].
The main point lies then in the absence of a convincing test for Mokyr’s hypothesis,
for the evidence brought about is considered fascinating but not conclusive.
1“How would we empirically distinguish between Mokyr’s “Industrial Enlightenment” and Mc-
Closkey’s “Bourgeois Revolution”, which emphasizes the enhanced status of the bourgeoisie and
their activities in European society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? How much is
the Industrial Revolution the product of enhanced rationality, as opposed to just enhanced social
status for entrepreneurs and the activities they had always carried out?” [Clark, 2012, p.12].
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2.1.3 Allen’s thesis: wages and energy
Allen [2009] proposes a different hypothesis on the “why England” topic, which is
in part complementary to Mokyr’s thesis. For Allen, there is no need to call in
cause the Enlightenment to justify the role of Britain as forerunner in industrialisa-
tion, it is in fact a simple reason of incentives that made mechanical work and its
gradual optimisation the better choice in England. The base-line argument is that
“the industrial revolution was invented in Britain in the eighteen century because
it paid to invent there” [Allen, 2009, p.2]. The reason is that it was a country with
relatively high wages and low costs of raw materials, while the economies of the rest
of Europe where different and not favourable to the adoption of capital-intensive
labour-saving technologies. The process started in England and was appropriate
for it and not for other countries, however in time, the gradual improvement of the
first technologies lowered the capital requirements and made it feasible for other
countries to adopt British technologies, spreading industrialisation. This is the ar-
gument brought about in a nutshell. It should be remarked here that what Allen
wants to prove is not that profitability was the only factor that lead toward the
insurgence of the industrial revolution in Britain, but rather that it is sufficient to
explain it [Allen, 2009, p.206]. Much of the book is constructed in giving details
and qualifying the reasons behind Allen’s claims. We will skip them and focus on
the section dealing directly with Mokyr’s thesis. Allen’s synthesises in two aspects
the potential signs of an enlightened invention culture: the number of links between
Inventors, and the number of experiments carried by them, as signalling respectively
the scientific interconnection and cooperation and the rational approach toward in-
vention, which should be part of an enlightened mindset. To do this he constructs a
set of “great inventors” and studies their links and research activities. The findings
partially confirm Mokyr in that experiments were done extensively while the links
between inventors are present only for half of the people involved [Mokyr, 2009,
pp.252-253]. An important remark of Allen is that the experimental attitude of
inventors and scientists has its starting point more than a century before the timid
beginning of the industrial revolution. It is in fact with the scientific revolution that
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we have a shift toward experiments, but its intensification is, according to Allen,
present in periods of time which are closer to 1700-1850.1 What is more, the demog-
raphy of inventors in England shows a concentration in the higher strata of society,
which were more literate and wealthy. This has some notorious exceptions, which
only encourages the idea that there was some sort of mobility and communication
between the practical world of craftsmen and the ivory towers of the learned men.
The inferences of Allen are based on a set of less than 80 inventors, yet it seems
to draw a picture which could be consistent with Mokyr’s ideas. However, culture
and the Enlightened version we are discussing, becomes only part of the story, and
Allen gives it a role as cofactor, which probably needs further discussion to find its
right place in the narrative of England at the time [Allen, 2009, pp.267-268]. Then
enlightenment was something broader and stemming from the scientific and material
revolution of the XVII century. It needed to find its proper path in any society in
which it blossomed, to allow for the rooting of industrial processes. However, this
path often was opened by institutional and structural choices, under some economic
constraints. Allen emphasises that the coming of the revolution in England hap-
pened because of the latter, which later made clear that the former could lead to
the same direction of growth, development and wealth. Culture is part of why Eng-
land is important, yet it is more the reason of why Europe was capable of imitating
England.
Both studies try to discuss variables who ideally suffer high problems of endo-
geneity and this aspect should be taken into consideration. The causal relationship
between culture and development, innovation and the material procedures of a given
period of time, are hard to disentangle. Important insights are still obtained and it
is possible to reduce the endogeneity problem via different techniques, both in the
design of econometric tests and the selection of the variables in use.
1It could be possible to understand this difference in timing by simply noting that the signs of
the scientific revolution we have take time to tickle down to lower strata of the intellectual life, as
well as to diffuse. However this statement should be proved as a bolder claim is that the timing
for diffusion is of three or four generations. Probably the intensification is due to the interaction
with a renewed interest in science and the material world, which is also a consequence of the ideas
coming from France.
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An interesting question, which is recurrent in many works, is concerned with the
reasons behind the absence of a revolution in contexts in which it was ponderable
before the English experience. This aspect is usually dismissed with a mixture of ar-
guments. For example, renaissance Italy lacked the institutions capable of delivering
the region out of its Malthusian condition, or the scientific mind-set and practical
orientation which could have created the proper incentives and premises for indus-
trialisation, and so on. However the limit of this approach lies in the necessity
of proving some implicit counter-factual, or avoiding the tautological consideration
that if something did not happen, a limit must have existed. The latter betrays a
rather deterministic conception of history.
Considering the long past before the industrial revolution, however, may grant
some interesting insights. In fact, if the Industrial Enlightenment is in some way
the cultural humus which made the birth, spread and resilience of industrialisation
possible, then its European character must be explained. The deep roots of indus-
trialisation are intellectual and social, its life is the economy. Thus, modernisation
in many countries required some sort of “Copernican revolution“ in ideas to allow
the transition from old modes of production to new ones. The changed attitude was
however prepared by idealists and philosophers, by thinkers and technicians, who
spread the gospel of innovation and free thought. To achieve this, some hotspots
of reasoning and a gradually tight European network of ideas must have emerged
in time. Indeed, communication and diffusion of novel ideas are a prerequisite to
industrial achievements. As we will see, in this sense the centres of power and rich-
ness shifted and moved across the continent, but their results were not static: ideas
circulated and opposed, creating an intangible capital of conjectures and practices,
which precipitated in the Industrial Enlightenment.
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2.2 Why eminent people?
This study concentrates on a particular index, ranging from 800 to 1800, which
studies the movement and concentration of figures who have contributed in pecu-
liar and persistent ways to the arts, sciences and technical innovation. They are
selected by following the work of Murray [2003] and then matched with additional
biographical coordinates who try to produce a map of the concentration and activity
of these innovators in Europe in a millennium. We will discuss the details of the
selection and the results in the following chapters. The scope of this paragraph is to
inform the reader about why is it worth to monitor them, apart from some scholarly
divertissement.
Assuming that the selection of eminent figures is significant and capable of repre-
senting where the top-distribution of capabilities was, there are at least three reasons
to study their composition.1 The first one is concerned with the proximate nature
of grand innovators in culture, which underpins the perception of active regions and
their ability to select and nourish their talents. The second one starts from the
assumption that great minds attract great minds, creating schools of thought and
new workshops. This property implies that the presence of many innovators signals
that there are some avenues of innovative thought where they are concentrating.
The third one is more narrative: great minds complement our narrative of different
periods of time, they tell something about it that cannot be grasped in other ways:
they open new roads, reconsider a given situation or reinforce a trend, they are the
crest of a wave but show were the wave will fall.
The proximate nature of grand innovators is of particular importance. Indeed,
1We discuss here about those capabilities that mattered for the subsequent centuries and do not
expect to be exhaustive about where all the talent was. Moreover, not all important contributors of
even grand distinction might have been captured in historical records, particularly in older periods
of time. The closer we get to the XVIII and XIX centuries, though, the better we can presume
is our capacity of selection. The asymmetrical distribution in the frequency of talents we have
in Murray’s record, might simply be due to the exponential demography of Europe in the period
under study and not to a lesser adherence to the truth about talent in the past. Literacy levels
and development, as we will see, account for talent.
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being at the top of a distribution of talent, they tell us something about the quality
of it. The studies on the industrial revolution and the centuries preceding them
show us that innovation in different sectors was something proper of the elite. It
was certainly so with pure sciences, even though exceptions are many. Innovation
in production rather was punctual and, at a more intermediate level, linked with
the expertise and observation of skilled artisans. The history of innovation until the
XIX century is commonly one of trial and error rather than meticulous experimen-
tation. Finally, the best talents of an age concentrated where the most for their
emergence was present: they are the arrow pointing to places in which the buzz
shined, power clustered and novelty was born. Indeed, an important assumption
over talent reinforces this: talent is uniformly distributed. Wherever a geography
of high clusters of talent emerges then, some factors are capable of influencing the
neighbours and attracting their talents, as well as selecting the local high-end gifted.
Impoverished regions, where opportunities are scarce and information is infrequent,
will expectedly have very few talents to offer to the world, because they are inca-
pable of finding them. Moreover, inclusive societies should be capable of fostering
the selection of talented people irrespectively of their background, making thus the
occurrence of eminent talents more probable. These elements will be tested in the
following chapters. In this way, the geography of talent and innovation in the sci-
ences and technology juxtaposes with the theories on the Industrial Enlightenment,
giving them some new light.
2.2.1 Cities, talents and culture
Talent is not indifferent to geography. Moreover, the outliers of a century aren’t
neither. As we already marked, they needed the power and energetic potential of
those areas whose dynamism made them contribute at the frontier of innovation.
Talents where “selected” to contribute to a process, they could not replicate them-
selves if not by finding and teaching new high-end talent, which could have had
inside a new grand innovator. One of the greatest attractors of talent are cities.
They are “uniquely positioned to attract creative people, who in turn help spur eco-
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nomic growth” [Florida, 2005, p.32], hence being the incubator for growth. Not all
cities however tend to be considered equal, in fact “creative people power regional
economic growth, and these people prefer places that are innovative, diverse, and
tolerant” [Florida, 2005, p.34]. The degree of inclusive and diverse societies, both
in terms of cultural aspects and disciplines, are a real blessing or an impediment
toward the creation and attraction of talent. Diversity seems to attract high-end
talents, who seek a vast array of stimuli and personal satisfaction [Florida, 2002]. If
this is the case, then we should expect to see the same behaviour, mutatis mutandis,
in the data concerning the most important figures of European history between the
years 800-1800. Indeed, if Mokyr’s conjecture is sound, some cities should become
more important and attract innovators if they offer them opportunities and rewards.
Moreover, diversity should carry its mark and the most prolific cities will show signs
of a multifaceted cultural environment.1 All these reasons make the city level data
a good reference: they are at the crossing of theories of city as economic incubator
(more so in ages where city mortality was higher), talent as micro-regional phe-
nomenon, and regional development as correlating with artisans and experts (who
are proxied by high end talents).
2.2.2 Counting people: the case of prosopography
Resorting to important inventors and innovators to draw a picture of a given pe-
riod is potentially illuminating over some regularities or features and at the same
time subject to the risk of a biased description. Prosopography, that is the study
of the biographical characteristics of a collection of people who share some specific
traits (for example, inventors, scientists or artists of a given period), is exactly sub-
ject to these two qualifications. In their study of innovation in technology in the
United States (1790-1930), Khan and Sokoloff [2004] collected patent filings of a
series of important inventors, and compared them to others, in order to emphasise
the differences in the USA system with respect to others, as well as understanding
1This is somehow against the idea of specialisation which could come from a Ricardian view
of cities as cluster of specialists. However, theories seeing diversity as a strategic resource, which
maintains elements that favour the adaptability of the city and hence its survival, are in accordance
with our thesis. For a study at country level see Cristelli et al. [2013].
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inventive procedures of high impact innovators. Their findings support the idea that
the structure of the American patent system was capable of encouraging innovation
by creating the right mix of incentives to invent, rather than by protecting some
already outstanding inventors. It was the institutional system (in this case, the
unique formulation of the USA patent laws) that favoured innovation. Studying the
behaviour and history of invention of a restricted group of people then, allow us to
obtain interesting results at a broader level.
The same inferences that we can draw from a representative or proximate group,
for which we have more information, can - so to say - haunt our data. Indeed,
MacLeod and Nuvolari [2006] show the basic risk the study by Khan and Sokoloff
take. The two authors are in fact “concerned that Khan and Sokoloff treat the
selection of their “great inventors” as unproblematic, and risk the perpetuation of
their sources’ particular notions about inventors and inventions. “ and “contend
that valuable exercises such as Khan and Sokoloff ’s should go hand-in-hand with a
critical reflection on the selection criteria followed by the compilers of the collective
biographies [. . . ] it seems unlikely that iconic works of collective biography [. . . ] will
provide a random or representative sample of inventors” [MacLeod and Nuvolari,
2006, pp.761-762]. In order to avoid this, a study of the modality of selection and
rationale behind some choices or others is required. This will be done in the next
chapter, where we will discuss the methodology followed by Murray in selecting his
“eminent people”. Importantly, we won’t use biographies in any extensive way. The
data of this study is simple and gives us a sketched picture of Europe. Yet the
choice of some names in spite of others carries some degree of risk, which we must
confront with. However, the bias that could be present in Murray is probably of
small magnitude as long as we are in Europe.
2.2.3 Human capital and the city
In a study published on the Quarterly Journal of Economics concerning the level of
literacy and human capital in the period of the industrial revolution, Squicciarini
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and Voigtla¨nder [2015] use as novel measure city level data about the subscription
to the Encyclope´die. In this way, they hope to capture the “upper-tail” knowl-
edge present in the city. They consider much studies on the topic to be “based
on education or literacy as skill measures of the average worker” which “may veil
the role of scientifically savvy engineers and entrepreneurs at the top of the skill
distribution” [Squicciarini and Voigtla¨nder, 2015, p.1826]. In our study, we try to
test in a similar manner if a different measure of the quality of the “upper-tail” is
important. The choice by Squicciarini and Voigtla¨nder has some benefits as well
as limitations though. One benefit is that it is more pervasive and geographically
vast: it can confront a measure (subscription to the Encyclope´die, as measure of top
human capital) with another (literacy) and infer how do they relate with respect to
production and innovation. The two authors find that literacy is a predictor of the
performance in production, affecting income, but not growth, which needs people
adopting new technology. Growth at the contrary correlates with the presence of
a higher number of top-quality human capital, as measured by their index. They
warn us about some potential deeper determinants of a higher number of subscrip-
tions. On the other hand, the assumption that people subscriptions are a reliable
measure has some potential limits (e.g. cultured but non-active people could have
subscribed, hence disturbing the results). Interestingly, in the section concerning
robustness checks, a control over the cities of birth and death of “famous scientists”
in France as coded by Croix and Licandro [2012] is done, with positive correlation
between the variable of this study and famous people. This result underpins and
supports our choice.
2.2.4 Cultural Entrepreneurs
There is another compelling argument in favour of using exceptional individuals as
proxy for a wider culture backing them (and thus as exemplary of a given cultural
milieu). This is based on Mokyr [2013], who theorises a powerful analogy between
innovation in product and new ideas. Important scientists, inventors, artists, are
like a cultural entrepreneur who innovates in the field of ideas. As an entrepreneur is
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capable of innovation in production, technology and so on (at least in the economic
standard tale about the topic), so does the cultural entrepreneur modify the set of
potential ideas that can be used by people around him. Cultural entrepreneurs need
not to be the effective innovators, but are those successful at codifying and spread-
ing in an intelligible way new concepts. They can do that because they act in an
environment that is receptive to some degree to the innovation. An interesting fact
is that as in real enterprises, not many of them are capable of grand innovations: a
vast mass of followers who produce micro-inventions and little optimisation, coexist
with the grand top-firms guided by their guru-managers. Mutatis mutandis, the cul-
tural framework could be similar: moved by fame or other personal objectives (even
the search for profit), cultural entrepreneurs act at different levels modifying and
influencing others with their ideas. These ideas compete and can be adopted, and
are modified (like the micro-innovation of firms), by the myriad of little thinkers,
opinionated people and so on, that constitute the majority of ”cultural agents”. In
this kind of framework, a grand innovator needs to rest on the shoulders of thou-
sands of followers and co-authors of his ideas, who can understand him and grant
him a legacy. The importance of this theory is clear: if a grand innovator needs to be
backed by some receptive background, we can assume that where we see a greater
concentration of them there is a grander ”market” for ideas, and this is growing
fuelled by and fuelling its eminent figures. Top cultural entrepreneurs are reliable
proxies of areas that are active and at the frontier of culture. Using our eminent
people count then, can tell us something about where come sectors concentrated.
In the next chapter we introduce our source, which is different from Croix and
Licandro [2012] and follows a complex method of selection of “eminent people”. In
fact, rather than considering fame, it evaluates their long-term contribution to their
field of study or discipline. This makes Murray [2003] a source of great reliability.
This should not be viewed as in opposition with the studies and methodologies
presented in this chapter, but rather as complementing them with a robust selection
of names.
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Chapter 3
Human Accomplishment
The book of Murray [2003], Human Accomplishment, is our main source of data
concerning the most important innovators in culture for the period under study.
It should be remarked that by culture we refer here to a broad concept, one that
embraces the arts and science as well. In the following paragraphs we shall highlight
two elements of the seminal work of Murray: the first one deals with the selection
method and definition of what an important, or in Murray words, “eminent” person
is. The second one will present some results and theories concerning the data that
are already present in Murray. They will serve as a directive to discuss the evidence
about the history of culture in Europe as a wide-ranging phenomenon, and its link
with the Industrial Enlightenment.
3.1 What is eminence?
Murray uses “eminence to characterize people” who are reflections of “excellence
in human accomplishment” [p.59].1 He distinguishes excellence from mere fame by
emphasising that fame is the simple perception of the relevance of a given figure,
while eminence is fame of those who show excellence in contribution to development
(in knowledge, material, artistic and so on). He categorises the different contribu-
tors per sector: humanities, science and technology are somehow the branches he
1We will cite only the pages, as the whole chapter is based on Murray’s book and uses citation
extensively, in particular in note.
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tries to define, in order to create a sample with a good coverage of the different
aspects of Human Accomplishment.1 But what is excellence in detail? On scientific
terms, it identifies those who are capable of discovering what Murray calls “truth”:
a stable regularity or principle which is held to be important and influences our view
of the world.2 In fact, “in the hard sciences and mathematics, excellence involves
the discovery of truth. In technology and medicine, excellence involves the applica-
tion of truth to produce desired results.” [p.60-61]. Doctors hence will use known
knowledge in a novel way, as a technician does with some new prototypes. This is a
bit counterintuitive with respect to those views according to which innovation is a
process partially independent of knowledge, where routinized processes matter more
and science only play a partial role. We should remark that we are emphasising
major innovations, which usually require some sort of capability, which relates to
the comprehension of natural phenomena, or at least applying some method in order
to manage to replicate the discovery on a larger scale. However, Murray is probably
a bit too overconfident about the idea of progress and truth.3 A potential objection
with the raw weight a phenomenon might get in a given interpretation of a period,
is that other factors might distort its importance. For example, the philosophical
implications of the scientific revolution (which, in my opinion, can add up in part
to the notion of eminence) or the political value of the discovery of atomic energy,
all inflate the references to a discovery or innovation. Inflated values, because they
regard factors other than the importance in the field, are problematic. Yet, to cite
Murray: “the correspondence between importance defined by the historians’ allo-
cation of attention to events and excellence as I am defining the term is close.”
[p.62].
1“Scientific is a word I will use throughout the rest of the book as a label for referring to
the individual hard sciences (astronomy, biology, chemistry, the Earth Sciences, and physics) plus
mathematics, medicine, and technology.” [p.60]
2“Truth as I am using the term similarly refers to knowledge that meets standard scientific
criteria.” [p.60]
3“The edifice of scientific accomplishment can be seen as a process of convergence, sometimes
with major deviations and backslidings, on that final Truth with a capital T that we may reasonably
think will forever be incompletely known to us.” [p.61]
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3.1.1 Artistic values: what pleases the eye
The definition of artistic value is itself problematic, for it requires the use of esthetical
categories. However, Murray dismisses these difficulties by calling for some criteria,
which, rooted in the reflections of philosophers such as David Hume and Immanuel
Kant, explain why “some works seem to endure across time and cultures” [p.63].
These human criteria are such that some works of art survive fashion and opinion
and become a universal symbol, pleasant to the eye.1 This must then be recognised
by experts, who more than simple people, have the understanding to analyse and
define artistic procedures.2 They can express whether “A is better than B—better in
a sense that is intrinsic to the nature of the excellence in the field in question” [p.66].
Neglecting the theoretical possibility of the impossibility of a judgment concerning
art or science is simply refuted by Murray. He does not desire to take seriously
postmodernity.
3.1.2 Reference works and inventories
The need of an expert view over the topic becomes necessary to select the eminent
figure. Experts have a better understanding and more instruments to distinguish and
rank. However, a single expert opinion is necessarily influenced by his personal taste
and view, whatever the effort toward objectiveness. Therefore, in Murray’s view,
by confronting many different works, a map ordering the most cited and ranked
authors can emerge which is resilient to the occasional less-eminent author. Bigger
reference works per every sector where used for “two roles in determining eminence
[. . . ] First, these works could be used to identify the population of people who were
worthy of study [. . . ]Second, these reference works and histories could be used to
1Mere pleasure for a work of art seems to dismiss its value, which could be related to its
symbolic nature. However, in this case, either the symbol is appreciated because the form can
transport it, or because it is imbued with other qualities that go beyond the appreciation of the
medium that carries it. In both cases, the evaluation by experts can discriminate between the two
and asses its value in light of our current understanding.
2“I take from such observations my third proposition, that the relationship of expertise to
judgment forms a basis for treating excellence in the arts as a measurable trait. This is obviously
the most controversial of the three assertions and does not lend itself to incontrovertible proof.
An explicit statement of the position will at least let us know where we may disagree at the end.”
[p.66]
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calibrate eminence within the population of qualified people” [p.73]. Then, because
“different critics are tapping into a common understanding of importance in their
field, they make similar choices.Various factors go into the estimate of importance,
but they are in turn substantially associated with excellence.” [p.92]. What Murray
makes is substantially a synthesis of the opinion of experts in every field; it is a
condensed picture of importance. With the collected data, he produces what he
calls inventories. They are divided per sectors and list the most recurring figures
selected via the vast study of several biographical and prosopographic works, which
we tried to justify in Murray own words. Some sectors are dropped because they
are either too young as a discipline (hence, do not possess enough sources, common
opinions and shared methodologies) or too difficult to reconcile with a matrix of
common identification values. Inventories feature an index, which is associated with
every author. The index is built in a rather neat way. Depending on the source
it tries to synthetize “for example, the number of index page references, column
inches of text, number of plates of artistic works— collected, combined, and con-
verted to a metric that is common to all of the inventories. The common raw score
across inventories represents in effect the average percentage of material devoted to
a given person.” [p.79]. The different raw scores are then converted into a common
scale ranging from 1 to 100. The distribution between the scores is designed to
be identical in every inventory. “In other words, it is a linear transformation, and
the shape of the raw and transformed distributions are precisely the same. These
are the index scores” [p.80]. Because the index scores are of dubious reliability, I
preferred to ignore them for much of the work. They can still be useful as source of
some additional information helping making sense, even if roughly, of the relative
importance in contribution of the authors we are studying.
Murray tries to answer some questions concerning the validity of his choice. The
first one deals with reliability. To address it Murray proposes two criteria. One is
the unconvincing “face validity”, which is based on the idea that any expert who
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sees a given inventory for his area of expertise would find it reliable.1 The other
one is statistical: a subset of the sample used to build his ranking yielding the same
result is reliable. For reasons of an insufficient base of consensus and the risk of
fashion on recent events, inventories for people born after 1950 are not built. For
inventories before this separation-date, sciences are considered by Murray of being
affected in a negligible way by fashion and the taste of observers, which is some-
thing we might agree on and that is rather useful for the purpose of the analysis
of Industrial Enlightenment and its roots. Finally, Murray observes that there is
a wider pool of critics today, offering diverse sources which reduce arbitrary and
idiosyncratic judgements.
In appendix 2 of Murray’s book, some additional details are presented to the
reader. We will recall a few of them to add some substance to the discussion of
the methodology followed so far. In Table 3.1, some details concerning the number
of sources used to construct the inventories are given. The table lists them per
category and gives an idea of the magnitude of the effort by Murray. The author
then discusses the criteria he followed to distinguish the relevance of people across
time. Substantially, as we already noted, importance is measured as the relative
space given in a work to a peculiar historical figure. This might be expressed as a
percentage (e.g. lines in a text). The index for every table, a score accounting for
the mean value assigned to a person across all the sources for a given inventory, is
constructed as [ai
A
]
· 100 = index value
where A is the maximum raw index value for a given author, while ai is the i-th
author in a category. Murray then painstakingly enumerates a series of potential
issues with the selection of sources, which he tried to address. For example, the
potential bias in coverage is addressed: he carries some tests to show that, at least
within his sample, results are robust even if some sources are randomly dropped.
1Murray almost reassures the reader that this is what happened to him when he presented his
results to some experts of his knowledge.
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Table 3.1: Total Sources and Persons by Category
Inventory Sources Persons
The Sciences
Astronomy 22 767
Biology 22 1,638
Chemistry 22 812
Earth Science 22 597
Physics 22 700
Mathematics 28 906
Medicine 20 1,080
Technology 19 1,139
Other 22 137
Philosophy
China 13 136
India 13 313
The West 14 885
Music (Western since 1200) 17 2,508
Visual Arts
China 20 421
Japan 16 318
The West 13 2,248
Literature
Arab world 15 209
China 15 548
India 12 353
Japan 12 258
The West 20 3,821
Total 183 19,794
Note: Some sources were used for more
than one category.
Table from: [Murray, 2003, p.476]
Finally, Murray shows that different scoring systems give the same results, trying
to prove that his selection is acceptable under different methodologies and that the
scores assigned are good. There are of course some issues that can be difficultly
solved, in the sense that no measure of the kind proposed by this work can be
convincing beyond doubt. Nevertheless, Murray is quite convincing in proving that
his synthesis is at least a good one under its assumptions. It is valid for different
indexing methods, it uses a vast amount of sources, and it is not influenced by some
peculiar sources: if a bias exists, it is of the whole sample. In this sense a short
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observation of the sources seems to indicate a conspicuous presence of Anglo-Saxons
authors with some French works. Even though the editors and works are of very
high standing, this might indicate a bias that sees some authors as more relevant
than others. As we will see, if we assume that this bias is present, the dominance
of French invention in our dataset is a more astonishing fact than under different
assumptions.
3.2 A theory on the determinants of eminence
“Human Accomplishment” presents some preliminary studies of Murray’s dataset to
the reader. They are of interest because they provide some background information
about how does the very top-talent behave and which are the regularities that can
be found. What is more it directly addresses some points that we might have treated
in our study and by giving out some results can allow a better focus on the theme
of the historical origins of the Industrial Enlightenment. Here we will report some
of them, which are most fit for the following parts. After this brief and necessarily
incomplete exposition, we will introduce some theories interpreting the results about
talent and its distribution. They will serve as part of our explanatory conjectures.
3.2.1 Murray’s analysis
Some of the analysis by Murray is similar to what we will preliminarily do in the
next sections. So we will briefly recall some key points leaving to the next sections
an in-depth analysis.
One point that could be raised is concerned with gender issues. Murray clearly states
that he considered the potential omission due to a history of only “white males”,
and in his opinion they are limited because of the scholarly work that has tried in the
last decades to correct the trend. His work tries to trace excellence and, even though
he recognises the issue is important, women are de facto substantially excluded not
from his dataset but from records that allowed them to make an impact. That
said, the number of high impacting women is around the 2% of the total population
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(including Asia and the Middle East) [p.266]. Other data regard the geographic
distribution of contributions, which luckily for us, are gradually concentrated in
Europe. In particular science is almost only a European and in late year USA,
enterprise (97% of it comes from the two continents).1 If we consider the dataset
by Murray, we find some interesting spatial behaviour in time. It is not important
to recall it here, as it will be part of the next chapter discussion, but we might
introduce some key findings:
• Jews are a large share in many countries (in particular for periods after the
XVIII century). This is a resilient element even if we control for immigration
driven by economic or historical factors. What Murray proposes as an inter-
pretation is that these environments where favourable for the emergence of the
Jewish minority. Inclusive societies seem to benefit from their minorities.
• Britain, France, Germany and Italy are the richest countries in terms of in-
novators. If we look at Europe without considering borders, we find what
Murray’s call the “European Core” an area where almost all the important
figures (80%) for European history of eminence concentrated (see Figure 3.1).
The areas emerging within the European core are substantially those of the
Centre-North of Italy, Paris, London and the Flanders, and in minor fashion
continental areas of Europe (e.g. Wien, Berlin, Frankfurt areas, to name a
few).
• Eminent figures seem to cluster in different regions depending on their respec-
tive sectors. The time division used by Murray in his figures might be quite
distortive because of the time choice (1600-1800 for one figure, 1800-1950 for
the other): we will construct our own figures in the next chapter.
1“In recognizing how thoroughly non-European science and technology have been explored, let’s
also give credit where credit is due: By and large, it has not been Asian or Arabic scholars, fighting
for recognition against European indifference, who are responsible for piecing together the record
of accomplishment by non-European cultures, but Europeans themselves” [p.253]. In other parts,
Murray tries to evaluate whether a European bias is present: after a series of consideration and
use of the most authoritative and comprehensive sources, he still finds an overwhelming presence
of western contributions.
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The findings so far seem to confirm (or at least not to contradict) in a very loose
and intuitive term many common impressions concerning the directives of European
innovation. In particular some hotspots of the dataset are probably the most active
countries in contributing to development (or have been for many centuries) as well as
the most economically successful. What will emerge in the analysis of our composite
dataset, will sound familiar in many respects to the visions concerning the emergence
of cultural frontiers and innovation we revised in the first chapters.
Figure 3.1: The European Core
The figure shows where the majority of European eminent figures of the dataset by Murray con-
centrate. [Murray, 2003, p.293]
3.2.2 Two theories about the “gifted ones”
Having presented some preliminary findings that are shared between us and Murray,
I will now report two views that Murray maintains concerning the potential causes
of Human Accomplishment.
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The first explanation is related to “peace and prosperity”. Murray starts by stat-
ing the simple truth that “war and civil unrest disrupt all sorts of human activities;
why shouldn’t the arts and sciences be among them?” [p.332] he then cites the ex-
pansion subsequent to the Industrial Revolution as a brilliant example of the effects
of economic prosperity. However, if we look in detail, all the periods in European
history between 1400-1950 (but one could argue, all of European history after the fall
of the Western Roman Empire) have been punctuated and aﬄicted by war. Peace
cannot be consistently tested, according to Murray.1 Another point is concerned
with wealth: to disentangle high accomplishments in the arts or science and wealth
is a difficult task. Genius cannot manifest I a historical perspective independently
of some material support and transmission of its achievement, however it is rather
a consequence and there are examples where a declining wealth coexists with very
high productions and conquests. Other factors must be involved. A good example
of this is Spain: between the XVI and XVII century it was a rich and prosperous
country (due to the silver it extracted in South America), but this wrought ruin
upon its economy by disrupting its productive system. The same could be argued
for the causes of Human Accomplishment of Spain. In fact, “one might argue that
the riches encouraged its mini–golden age of writers and painters and its economic
decline caused the subsequent dearth. But it is easier to argue that the misused
wealth did nothing but harm” and “its output even during its best years was not
remarkable compared to the other major contributors“ [p.335]. This seems to point
to deeper causes, which I conjecture to be of institutional and cultural nature. In
general, correlations show a bivariate relationship, which resists population controls,
but “part of the effect comes from being richer compared to other countries during
the same time period, not from being richer in an absolute sense” [p.339]. This might
be due to many causes. Murray cites that being rich signals some economic incen-
tive toward mobility and the emergence of niches where innovators can fit, however
it might simple signal a vitality which is also cultural prima facie and not derived
from the economy.
1“This doesn’t mean that some degree of war and civil unrest are good for human accomplish-
ment” [p.336]
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The second potential cause of the emergence of “human accomplishment” is, in
Murray’s view, related with models of city outputs and externalities as well as to
institutions. One point is related with Simonton [1988]: previous generations of
inventors correlate with subsequent ones. This might be due to many causes, but it
allows us to point to a substantial resilience of talent way after the potential material
causes that firstly induced it. There is also a smaller but significant “contagion”
across fields in the same time period. Both the results might explain the pattern of
development we will observe in our data: the expansion of a network of inventors
over time, and the presence of different sectors with different concentrations in some
regions of Europe. Another important aspect is related with cities. We have already
commented on this aspect and we might skip it. It is worth recalling however that
“the greatest centers of accomplishment in every era were among the largest cities
in Europe, but some of the largest cities in every era produced little or no accom-
plishment.” [p.357]. This to exemplify that cities do matter but cannot be the only
element of our narrative.1
A final role is assigned to “freedom of action”. According to Murray, the freedom
of expressing talent in the political and public sphere encourages (or at least does not
trump) the flourishing of arts and science. Important notes are about fragmented
polities, city-states and monocratic forms of power which might have created the
kind of variability and diverse society that could stimulate and host inventors and
innovators alike.
1An interesting exception is France, where “the map resembles a pattern of iron filings scattered
on a surface with a magnet where Paris sits” [p.359]. We will come back on this peculiarity of
France.
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4.1 Cities, Roads and Bishops
The second reference dataset for our study is the one constructed by Bosker et al.
[2013]. In their study the authors study the factors that influenced the divergence
in urbanisation and ultimately European development in the centuries 800-1800.
European cities were less developed with respect to their counterparts but gradually
differentiated themselves from their Arabic equivalent and emerged as an inter-
connected and urbanised lot, who eventually explosively developed toward success.
The paper identifies a series of important factors for the divergence between the two
worlds. Some of them are useful for our analysis and specific to the dataset inde-
pendently of the addition of Murray selection of path-breaking innovators. For this
reason, we will highlight a series of take away points while describing the dataset.
Bosker at al. select a series of cities who had at least 10.000 inhabitants in one
century in the Middle East and Europe (there are 793 cities in their dataset). They
monitor the city condition across the centuries by mean of geographical, institu-
tional and economic variables.
Much of the discussion in the article focuses on economic prosperity and what
made the difference in urbanisation. The factors affecting most of the growth of
cities and their output are due to geographic and trade reasons: the authors argue
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that the religious difference between the Islamic and Christian world mattered, as
well as the means of transport and trade networks. In particular, the emergence of
new trade routes and trade technologies (which rendered some means of transport
outdated in the Islamic world), the impact of participation in politics and govern-
ment autonomy, all influenced the path toward growth and eventually the grand
divergence of Europe with respect to the rest of the world. The study is compara-
tive, so it marks what differs and in which way in terms of relative contribution to a
given measure of development: the inhabitants of a city. The choice of this variable is
due to the assumption that in pre-industrial world cities behaved as Malthusian en-
tities where population reacted positively with an increase in wealth. Moreover, the
estimates that exist which use some GDP measures, tend to be imprecise or partial
at city level and could not grant comparability for every city in every period of time.
Bosker et al. contains an interesting array of variables that can be useful in
our study. We find that Religious institutions (for their worldly aspects of power)
correlate with city growth and prosperity, and in many cases precede but “explain”
growth. The same holds true for universities. Political independence and proactivity
in influencing the decision of central governments (at parliamentary level) also influ-
enced growth: in the author’s view cities that could advocate the most gained some
comparative advantage. Finally, universities and the emergence of the modern state
did play a pivotal role. Stately power and the role of capitals becomes increasingly
evident in time, as we will see in our analysis.
Every city is identified by its own coordinates. These are the starting point for
the procedure that allows us to merge the dataset from Murray and that of Bosker
et al. The next section deals in detail with the procedure.
4.2 Dataset construction procedure step-by-step
The data retrieved from Murray constitutes the base for the expansion of the dataset
by Bosker et al. In fact, in order to define the number of eminent people per city
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per time-period, we need to identify and relate each of them to a precise set of
spatial and temporal coordinates. To do so, I introduce a table containing the in-
formation required, starting from the appendix tables we described in the previous
section. Each Murray’s table, divided by sector, contains the name of those people
who are selected as eminent according to the eminence criteria we presented in the
previous chapter, which we assume to be sufficient for a “general” selection. The
eminence-index is dropped in much of the work that follows. This is done because
the potential lower reliability of the index might add an unnecessary complexity in
our analysis. The consequence of such a choice, however, is the acceptance of the
implicit assumption that eminent figures are equally important, as they are ranked
with the same de facto weight. This might somehow be hard to justify. Yet, if
we assume that information concerning an innovation can spread during a century
across countries, making thus the disparity in emergence of single “powerful” inno-
vators in space less relevant over the long period, we can focus on the emergence
of eminence as a broad phenomenon. The single outstanding figure is, in this in-
terpretation, part of a “history of genius”: she might trigger the birth of a school
of thought, influence and attract other figures, but as a lonely innovator she has a
limited impact. In a subsequent part of the work, we consider the eminence-index as
a reliable source of information concerning the relative impact of innovators. In this
case, considerations concerning the birth of “schools of thought or craftsmanship”
could be tentatively assessed.
The first trivial step for the construction of the dataset is to unify the data: we
drop the division of tables by Murray and produce a comprehensive list of people.
Their specialisation becoming a variable. The preliminary list we obtain in this
way comprises four categories per entry: “name and surname”, “Murray’s date of
birth”, “country of origin” and “speciality”. The country of origin and speciality
(e.g. biology) are then suppressed to produce the input file for the subsequent step.1
The input is a list of two columns: one with the name and surname of the people
1However, in the analysis of the output, I considered the two dropped categories as a mean of
solving potential conflicts of identification.
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involved, the other with their birthdate (as in Murray).1 This input is processed by
a script written in Python.2 The script uses different sources to produce four new
entries per eminent figure: “birthdate”, “death date”, “birthplace”, “death place”.
Before discussing the script working, we must introduce two of the sources in use:
Wikipedia and DBpedia.
4.2.1 The role of Wikipedia and DBpedia
Wikipedia is an Internet encyclopaedia made up of hundreds of thousands of differ-
ent entries. It is free in access and almost all of its voices can be modified by anyone.
Because of this nature it can be easily manipulated and some of its content might
be biased or unreliable. At the same time, it is probably one of the greatest reposi-
tories of knowledge available in the internet. The nature of the information present
in Wikipedia greatly varies, and so does its accuracy. One tentative study by Giles
[2005], published as a Special Report in Nature, tries to confront with a traditional
encyclopaedia (the Encyclopaedia Britannica) the accuracy of the information pro-
vided in Wikipedia. The results were good, with a low degree of discordance. The
findings started a debate (see Encyclopædia Britannica [2006] and Nature [2006])
which is emblematic of the suspicion and doubts the scientific community has to-
ward studies trying to validate Wikipedia as a reliable source. This fear should not
be downplayed.3 We consider this aspect by using Wikipedia as an ideal repository
of simple and standardised information: the place of birth/death and the respective
birth/death year. Some checks in the process are also designed: we confront with
the Murray equivalent and any discrepancy is checked manually. Because we are
1Murray’s birthdate is obtained by subtracting 40 years from the date reported in his appendix.
The author clearly states that the year printed in his tables is the supposed year of activity, which
he arbitrarily sets at the fictitious age of 40 [Murray, 2003, p.513]. Young innovators who died
prematurely are still aged up to 40, whenever their birthdate is known. To construct a correct
reference year of birth, the systematic subtraction procedure was then necessary.
2For a general introduction to Python it is possible to refer to the official website https:
//www.python.org and to the many manuals available both on the web and in print format.
3In fact, the study by Giles was criticised methodologically for having selected what some
considered a biased sample and measure of accuracy. This points to the probable limited reliability
of some simple Wikipedia studies where the selection and analysis of the quality of the articles is
usually limited to few voices in a sub-set of comparable topics.
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interested in periods spanning across centuries and on regions surrounding reference
cities (those of the Bosker et al. dataset), rather than detailed locations, much of
the potential noise is irrelevant as long as it is distributed as a neighbourhood of
the correct reference point. Thus, any debated attribution in terms of time periods
or exact locations can be managed as long as it is of small nature. Finally, such
a use of Wikipedia is not novel in the literature. Some studies involve the use of
Wikipedia extensively. One branch use the website for analysing the perception
of some public and historical characters, as for Eom and Shepelyansky [2013], or
Skiena and Ward [2013]; another series of studies is more sociologic in flavour, such
as Aragon et al. [2011] and Yasseri et al. [2014], for they try to map controversies
and interconnections in the structure of Wikipedia. The scientific tradition of these
works is separate from ours because of the simpler use of Wikipedia we make. In
fact, we are interested in extracting some simple elements and use them to con-
struct an index. A closer project to what we aim to do is the one represented by Yu
and al. [2015] at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They resort to Murray
and Wikipedia and combine them to construct a database for the identification of
“famous” people. Their information level is however at national level and uses an
algorithm over the different translations of Wikipedia to identify their results. Be-
cause of some potential biases this approach might envisage, namely the asymmetry
in use of Wikipedia in different countries or even among European ones, we prefer
to use Murray and add simple details drawn from Wikipedia to his shorter but well
documented choice of influent people.
If we accept to use Wikipedia for getting some homogeneous information on
important people, we still need to find a good way to extract it. There are dif-
ferent strategies that can be implemented: from textual analysis of some given
pages to a qualified search in specific repositories of information. The latter is the
choice of this study. In order to collect the information needed, the DBpedia query
system was used. DBpedia is “a crowd-sourced community effort to extract struc-
tured information from Wikipedia and make this information available on the Web”
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(form http://wiki.dbpedia.org/about), it substantially downloads and organises
in database format the information contained in Wikipedia. This information is di-
vided in a well-structured system characterised by a specific “ontology”, that is the
principle regulating to which category and subcategory does an object belong. For
example, we might have a “place”, which by going down to the sub-sets of the ontol-
ogy is a “settlement”, and down again a “city”. However, a famous mountain (say,
the Ben Nevis) is certainly a “place”, but not a “city”: it is categorised as “Natural
Place” and, in this broad category, its lowest ontology is that of “Mountain”. This
kind of detailed systematisation exists for thousands of entries.1
4.2.2 Data extraction form Dbpedia
At this point, we can state the working of the script: initially it plugs the name
and surname into the Wikipedia search tool in order to manage for the variability
in the transliterations or the partiality in the use of names and surnames. In fact,
many Murray entries differed in some aspects of wording from their equivalent in
Wikipedia; the tools of Wikipedia’s search engine are then necessary as they can
correct for these errors and propose close matches when the correction is impossible.
An output as general as possible was produced by using also parts of the names in
the query (for example for cases in which some nickname or alternative form was
reported into parentheses). The result of this Wikipedia phase is a list of different
candidate names per entry in Murray.
The script can now proceed and, by recalling via the Wikipedia name its DB-
pedia counterpart, control for the birth age coherence for every candidate. To do
so it compares the DBpedia age for a candidate with the one reported in Murray
and, if not out of range, the candidate is accepted; otherwise, it is discarded. The
1“The English version of the DBpedia knowledge base describes 4.58 million things, out of which
4.22 million are classified in a consistent ontology, including 1,445,000 persons, 735,000 places
(including 478,000 populated places), 411,000 creative works (including 123,000 music albums,
87,000 films and 19,000 video games), 241,000 organizations (including 58,000 companies and
49,000 educational institutions), 251,000 species and 6,000 diseases.” (form http://wiki.dbpedia.
org/about).
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time-window was intentionally set wide as to avoid cancelling potential “close” can-
didates.1 Therefore, by this mean, the number of candidates is restricted to the
feasible ones. In case of a “no result” reply from Wikipedia, the Murray name is
retained for a manual search. The feasible candidates’ missing fields (birthplace,
death year etc.) are then completed by collecting the information via the query
system in DBpedia. Missing values where left blank and completed manually later.
The final result of this process is a CSV (Comma Separated Value) file with all the
feasible candidates’ fields as complete as possible. A manual check and selection
was then done over the output to eliminate doubles and wrong candidates, correct
evident mistakes and complete the fields for the matching entries, those deemed
coherent with Murray’s age and sector data.
4.2.3 Localising a city on the globe
The manually corrected output shown two locations: the birth and death ones.
These needed to be completed with their respective geo-coordinates. A Google API
(Application Programming Interface) giving the coordinates for a given location
name was implemented as a macro for a “Google Sheet” document. It is written
as a Java Script (JC).2 The code simply calls in the google function for a given
location name, and tries to print its latitude and longitude. The process is repeated
for every candidate. The expanded dataset can now be merged with the previous
information concerning the Murray index and scientific sectors. We finally have for
every eminent figure, as selected by Murray, her geo-location of birthplace and death
place, together with her historical dates of birth and death. Many birthplaces and
death places are small towns and minor settlements, usually close to bigger ones.
The data concerning them is not available and could not be significant. We choose
1This is particularly true for people who lived in ages for which the historical track is feeble.
In many parts, the years of birth are sometimes debated and differ greatly. Moreover, sometimes
the period of reference was rather general, with some authors being identified only as belonging to
a certain century and not another. For any excessively general timing, some fictitious years where
produced in order to place the person correctly in its century.
2The code was written by a blogger and can be obtained at the web-page https://vilimpoc.
org/blog/2013/07/11/google-spreadsheet-geocoding-macro.
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to use as proxy of the region economic development the closest Bosker et al. city.
This can be justified under the assumption that mobility is sufficient to allow for a
spill-over effect and that smaller towns usually act as satellites of bigger ones and
are in part linked to their fate. The distance between the true birthplace and the
proxy one can be used as a reference of the potential accuracy of the approximation.
A short code was used to calculate the closest reference city, which implemented the
orthodromic distance (the shortest distance on a sphere).1 Cities farther than 1500
km were dropped: we can either assume that the effect of the centre is inexistent or
simply see that they are in another continent (e.g. New York’s closest reference city
is Galway). With this last procedure the table is complete for the transposition in
the dataset by Bosker et al.
4.2.4 Final refinements
The reference cities per period of time we obtained were used to count the number of
eminent figures per Bosker at al. city per century. This was done using the division
by Murray: firstly death count and birth count for all the eminent figures, then for
those working in the humanities, followed by a count for the science sector and tech-
nology, and finally only technology one.2 A similar procedure was used in building an
index per kind of sectors per city, summing the different scores Murray assigned to
its eminent people. The data so obtained was plugged into the Bosker et al. dataset.
At this point we are ready to discuss some general features of the data. This
will form the base for testing some hypotheses concerning the role of socio-economic
factors in shaping the geography of culture and seeding the roots of the Industrial
Enlightenment.
1There exist a more precise approach, based on the Vincenty’s formulae, which was initially
tested. However, the formulae do not always converge to a solution and can give rise to some
problems in computation. The great-circle, or orthodromic distance at the contrary always yields
a solution which, four our approximations, was sufficiently precise.
2Humanities: Western art, Western literature, Western philosophy, Western music, Arabic
literature. Science: Mathematics, Physics, Natural Science, Chemistry, Medicine, Astronomy.
Technology is simply Murray’s category by the same name.
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In the discussion that follows, it is important to maintain the theoretical framework
proposed by Allen and Mokyr as a reference point. Despite some useful variables
of economic nature, the dataset is substantially short of reliable standard economic
indicators (for example, an estimate of the GDP per capita), and is based on indi-
rect proxies of wealth (like the population level).1 We need to consider this aspect
and draw our understanding of the economy from our sources and other historical
studies, which are fortunately present in abundance. At the same time however,
we have abundant cultural and institutional variables. The tables and analysis that
I will present in the first part of this chapter is focused on testing culture and its
differences, as well as the spatial and temporal features of the distribution of emi-
nence. We will then introduce some regression analysis and evaluate its reliability.
Finally, a model concerning the mobility of talent across Europe will be presented
and we will discuss its implications for the Industrial Revolution in the perspective of
the Industrial Enlightenment conjecture. This will shed some light on its historical
origin.
1We could not straightforwardly complete, for the period of time 800-1800, the data concerning
every single city. No such study exists in the knowledge of who writes as to cover the whole of the
dataset. Future avenues of research might complete in this line what was tentatively started here.
Given the time and energy spent for the work, which was substantially focused on the collection of
complementary data for Murray innovators and the harmonisation of the two datasets, there was
no possibility to exert such an effort.
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5.1 Geography and concentration
Figure 5.1: Different heat-map estimates for the years 800-1400. The scale of density
varies in every map as to emphasise the relative concentration per period of time.
The blue areas are the most dense.
(a) 800-1200, birth (b) 800-1200, death
(c) 1300-1400, birth (d) 1300-1400, death
We start our analysis by plotting a heat-map for all the population of innovators
in Europe, for each century in the time span 800-1800. The map is split in two
tables, one for the period 800-1400, in Table 5.1, the other for the period 1500-1800,
in Table 5.2. We have some data about the Middle-East which is not shown if we
maintain the focus over Europe. What matters in this respect is that Arabic innova-
tors substantially disappear after the middle-age, signalling a shift that even if not
economical, is already cultural. This aspect should be qualified: it is possible that
the subsequent centuries of stagnation of the Arab world and its lag behind the great
divergence of Europe might have in some way corrupted the record of innovators in
favour of the Europeans. Nonetheless, this is an untestable hypothesis, as were we
to have found an eastern innovator that innovated before the west, he would have
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probably been mentioned in the sources used by Murray. Moreover, Murray goes
into great detail and uses specific ways to control for a potential western bias. We
should accept that if no Arabs appear after a certain year or century, they probably
signal a decline in innovation in the arts, science and technical applications. The
situation in Europe in the period is by no mean excessively different. If we consider
the first centuries of our dataset, some focal areas of innovation and growth can be
spotted. Expectedly, they confirm the common wisdom concerning the emergence of
urban areas and city states in Europe. The maps (a) and (b) in Table 5.1 condense
more centuries in one interval, because the data is sparse before the XVII century.
We can justify this joining as well as the scarcity of data by noting that the pace
of innovation in Europe followed an exponential rate and hence at the time there
was little innovation (with some fluctuations, of course), and that mobility was re-
duced even though there were some notable exceptions, that the balance of power
in terms of attractiveness for a scholar was not shifting too abruptly.1 What do we
understand of Europe from the figure? Two aspects are confirmed: cities tend to
act as attractors and talent is diffused but need a positive ambient to emerge. The
role of cities as incubators is self evident, while birth places are more diffuse, people
tend to concentrate in some areas. There is a certain degree of mobility but a series
of urban focal points emerge. They may not be one city only, but a conglomerate
of close developed and interacting urban centres (like in Tuscany, were the virtue
is shared among at least four cities, even though Florence will come to dominate
them). The impression we got from the literature concerning the role of cities is well
confirmed in this respect: they attract talents and offer them more opportunities
to grow. This attractiveness, we expect, should correlate with expanding economic
output as a signal of opportunities. Another element is that cities (especially in the
period 1300-1400) become centres of political and religious power, that are capable
1In an unpublished chart each century was analysed. The substantial lesson is that the early
middle age sees no out of the crowd centres (with the exception of Paris, already capable of
exerting a certain attractiveness) while the talents are substantially scattered across the European
core. This is an interesting aspect, as we might conjecture that talent is “still” distributed, in
the sense that the occasional genius popping out in the population does not need any particular
local economic and productive force to emerge (but rather some luck or the possibility to move),
as there are no areas which are ”relatively more” on the frontier of innovation.
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of commissioning works celebrating power and the city itself. In time, however, the
same power that attracts could become an impediment toward growth: institutional
conservatism does no good and can explain shifts in interest toward places where
institutional mixes are more favourable to intellectual entrepreneurship. The sec-
ond aspect that we remarked, concerns the role of the institutional geography for
the emergence of talent. This will be emphasised in our regression tables, yet the
role of some forms of organisation are relevant. Provided there is bread to feed the
artist or inventor (that is the economic milieu useful for the flourishing of the arts),
other aspects stimulating the diffusion of ideas and their heterodox approaches are
important. Renaissance Italy and the Flanders emerge gradually out of the chaotic
period of 800-1200, where Tuscany is already flourishing from the X century. It was
the mix of free cities with many patrons and a stronger mercantile attitude that
fostered an already rich region. Other areas follow a similar pattern, they become
focal and gain in attractiveness. In fact by the end of the XV century we have
only three focal areas (signalled by the death places): Paris, the Flanders and the
Centre-North of Italy. The core starts getting into shape. One important remark
concerns the substantial end of innovations in the Iberian peninsula. The initial
presence of important Arabic innovators that fade away century after century, is the
most emphatic sign of the end of the Arabian dominance. It also shows that the
cultural system of the Islamic Iberian cities, which resembled in many ways some
subsequent European experiences, had the force and conditions to produce innova-
tors. This was lost with the following policies and choices of Spain. We will discuss
this aspect and its importance in a separate paragraph.
Table 5.2 presents the next progression from 1500 to 1800. The birth of the nation
state is undeniable, with capital cities becoming focal points capable of attracting
great minds. This reinforces the impression that patronage and opportunities mat-
ter, but more so a vast world were the concentration of interests and wealth favours
the emergence and gains for whoever wants to innovate, to the cultural innovators.
Other focal points emerge in Germany and Austria in the same time. The indus-
trialising areas of England are denser than in the centuries before, and are so in
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Figure 5.2: Different heat-map estimates for the years 1500-1800. The scale of
density varies in every map as to emphasise the relative concentration per period of
time. The blue areas are the most dense.
(a) 1500-1600, birth (b) 1500-1600, death
(c) 1700, birth (d) 1700, death
(e) 1800, birth (f) 1800, death
the early stages of industrialisation. When studying inventors and scientists we will
asses this. France, at the contrary, is still dominated by Paris.
If we look closer at the XIX century, in Table 5.3 there is an interesting aspect
for discussion: under the assumption that the death place indicates the direction
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Figure 5.3: Heat-maps for 1800. The scale of density varies in every map as to
emphasise the relative concentration. The blue areas are the most dense.
(a) 1800, birth
(b) 1800, death
of where cultural entrepreneurs are moving, while the birth place is a function of
previous entrepreneurs (something that Murray systematically finds in the data),
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then the regions surrounding Manchester and Edinburgh are gradually dying out.
At the same time they were rather active in the XVIII century. In this respect,
they tell us a story that is consistent with Mokyr’s view. In a more systematic
way, looking at Table 5.4 seems to confirm that a model of replication and diffusion
(driven by replication per se and economic potentiality, under a set of institutional
stimuli, could be suggested). Other themes of speculative nature can be presented
in general terms, but this preliminary overview is sufficient, what is left out will be
lighted when needed.
Figure 5.4: Birthplaces progression in time of eminent figures for all the categories.
(a) 800-1200 (b) 1300-1400
(c) 1500-1600 (d) 1700
5.1.1 Science and invention
The map of the evolution of eminence across Europe follows some general features
we already noted: a tendency toward a diffused birth which is then captured by some
major cities and channelled toward a given focal point, giving therefore a more con-
45
5. Results
Figure 5.5: Heat-maps for Science in 1700-1800. The scale of density varies in every
map as to emphasise the relative concentration. The blue areas are the most dense.
(a) 1700, birth (b) 1700, death
(c) 1800, birth (d) 1800, death
centrated death map. It also follow the tides of history from one emerging area
to another. The same holds for the group of the innovators in Science (Table 5.5).
However, because we study a sub-group, some “anomalies” emerge. For example, for
the two centuries that interest us, who are concerned with Mokyr’s thesis, there is a
clear shift toward the northern parts of Europe for what concerns scientific progress.
In particular England is remarkably active and capable of providing a great deal of
innovators. The same holds true for France (with the usual Paris effect) and, in the
XIX century, the growing new power: Germany. The centre of activity has moved
and science as well is no longer the monopoly of a few rich countries. In fact, the
European core is aflame, but what set it on-fire is now in part death: Italy and the
Flanders.
The condition of European invention seems to follow in part the pattern from
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Figure 5.6: Heat-maps for Invention in 1700-1800. The scale of density varies in
every map as to emphasise the relative concentration. The bluish areas are the
most dense. Yellow areas are denser than red ones. In the map for the deaths in
1800 the radius has been expanded due to the high concentration and relatively
limited number of people.
(a) 1700, birth (b) 1700, death
(c) 1800, birth (d) 1800, death
the diffusion and evolution of Science. There are however some differences that can
be spotted even on a map. The first one concerns the degree of diffusion of some
inventors in the period. Of the figures that could be fitting in a common sense idea
of innovator, and that could legitimately stand at the crossing between a traditional
and a cultural entrepreneur, the inventor of the XVIII-XIX century is certainly the
best example. He is both thinker and technician, even though sometimes is more a
smart technician than else. If we accept the tore of proxy for our eminent inventors,
then invention was a rather limited phenomenon at the time. There are substantially
only two poles of innovation: England and France (mostly only in Paris).
Accepting the view that birth and death somehow exemplify a tendency and
evolution in the century, the importance of England in invention is greater between
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1700 and 1850.1 This remarkable result, if put into the perspective of the previous
centuries, is more so as the city of Paris substantially dominates other cities as
cultural centre of Europe in the millennium under study (see Appendix B). In fact
Paris is never surpassed as urban leader of Europe in terms of Invention. Table 5.2
and Table 5.1 speak for themselves.
Table 5.1: Top 10 cities per Inventors’ number: 1800
Birth
City All Humanities Science Inventors
Paris 87 61 21 5
London 46 25 17 4
Hannover 6 2 1 3
Wien (Vienna) 33 18 13 2
Dijon 3 0 1 2
Frankfurt a Main 9 0 7 2
Stuttgart 10 5 3 2
Belfast 5 0 3 2
Edinburgh 8 1 5 2
Glasgow 7 0 5 2
Wroclaw (Breslau) 15 12 2 1
Death
City All Humanities Science Inventors
Paris 174 122 40 12
London 47 24 16 7
Nice 21 15 3 3
Versailles 12 7 2 3
Berlin 44 17 24 3
Heidelberg 9 0 6 3
Muenchen 19 4 12 3
Stuttgart 8 2 4 2
Deptford 6 0 4 2
Exeter 6 2 2 2
Note: In absolute values
But if we consider country level data, the impression is subverted and the
supremacy of England is evident (Table 5.3). Only during the XIX century France
seems to be slightly more attractive. Considering the potential fluctuations in talent
for such small numbers, we might consider them to be aligned in their background
and cultural milieu for invention. Importantly, the industrial revolution and its in-
1Sub-table (d) in Figure 5.6 on the preceding page shows only London as relevant in England
at the end of the century, and it comes as a second best with respect to Paris.
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Table 5.2: Top 10 cities per Inventors’ number: 1700
Birth
City All Humanities Science Inventors
Braunschweig 5 1 1 3
London 23 14 6 3
Plymouth 6 1 2 3
Preston 7 2 2 3
Lyon 4 0 2 2
Rouen 4 1 1 2
Bolton 3 0 1 2
Leeds 2 0 0 2
Nottingham 4 0 2 2
Paisley 3 1 0 2
Death
City All Humanities Science Inventors
Paris 130 66 56 8
London 58 32 20 6
birmingham 4 0 1 3
Edinburgh 16 4 9 3
Bruxelles (brussels) 5 1 2 2
Versailles 4 1 1 2
Derby 4 1 1 2
Castres 1 0 0 1
Chalon-sur-saone 1 0 0 1
Lyon 1 0 0 1
Note: In absolute values
ventors were concentrated in some specific areas, as we have remarked in the initial
part of the work, hence the spotted behaviour we observe is no surprise. Science
and Technology seem to usually come hand in hand with a given ratio in many top
cities. There is, however, one notable exception: the northern part of England and
Scotland in the period 1700-1800 seem to be dominated by technology: their figures
are rather different from their counterparts. This seems in line with the suggestions
coming both from Mokyr and Allen.
5.2 Regression Analysis
We can now resort to some more formal analysis. In particular we are going to
use some non-linear counting models. We will initially employ a simple Poisson
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Table 5.3: Number of Inventors, 1600-1800
Birth
Country 1600 1700 1800
UK 8 30 21
France 3 15 15
Germany 2 3 14
Austria 0 0 2
Death
Country 1600 1700 1800
UK 10 29 21
France 2 15 23
Germany 2 2 13
Austria 0 0 1
Note: In absolute values
regression with robust standard errors [Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p.321] for the
preliminary analysis. The model has an excessive number of zeros and cannot be
considered particularly reliable, in fact it’s mean and variance do not equate in an
acceptable way. We provide two examples of the results that can be obtained in this
way only to add to the potential insights the reader might get. The other estimates
are given in Appendix A. Given the difficulty for the Poisson model, a zero-inflated
Poisson model has been chosen [Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p.601] and inflated for
city population. The zero-inflated model is fit for the task but has very little signif-
icant values the more we dwell into details per country and time period. Therefore,
for reasons of space, only the relevant aspects of the results will be shown. In a
subsequent analysis a conditional fixed effect panel model (grouped at city level)
with clustered errors [Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p.638-639] will be used. We set
as dependent variable the number of innovators counted at reference city level per
century. We try to express them using series of independent institutional variables,
geographic proxies and an indicator of the population level.
We will use the birth data and leave to Appendix A the other tables. Substantial
differences in the regressions will be emphasised.
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The first regression we present is thus a simple Poisson regression with robust
standard errors for every sector over a series of variables. These variables are demo-
graphic, geographical and institutional. We list them in detail.
• Urban potential, is the distance-weighted sum of the size of all other cities,
which is based on De Vries [1984]. It is a measure of urbanisation with respect
to other (large) urban areas.1
• Population, is the population recorded for values greater than ten thousand.
• Sea, is a dummy for whether the city has a port or is connected to the sea.
• River, is a dummy for whether the city is connected to a river.
• Roman Road, is a dummy for whether the city is on one of the old Roman
roads.
• Roman Hub, is a dummy for whether the city is at the crossing of two or
more Roman roads.
• Capital, is a dummy for whether the city is a capital city.
• University, is a dummy for whether the city has a university.
• Bishop, is a dummy for whether the city has a bishop.
• Archbishop, is a dummy for whether the city has an archbishop.
• Plundered, is a dummy for whether the city was plundered in the century
before the one under study.
The regression results are given in Table 5.4 on page 53. The zero-inflated equivalent
is given in Table 5.5 on page 54. This sketched result can give us an idea of where
to look for some insights. Generally speaking, both urban potential and the size of
population exert a positive effect over the probability of the emergence of a famous
1UPijt =
∑n
j 6=i
popjt
Djt
where popjt is the population of city j at time t. Djt is the great circle
distance between city i and city j calculated using their respective coordinates.
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person, meaning (at this very basic level) that interconnection and wealth matter in
the development of ideas and culture. In particular, the intensity of population in
terms of its predictive power is grander. Areas that are richer and more populated
will have a greater chance to get a famous person. Rivers are an important form of
connection which seems to account to some extent for the results. In the subsequent
analysis per country per period we will see they matter, but in a changing way.
Roman roads exert a negative effect, a somehow puzzling result. Capital status and
universities exert their positive effect. In the whole population the effect of capitals
is null only on inventors, and rather strong for humanities, signalling the potential
effects of peculiar market opportunities and forms of patronage. Religious figures in
general are correlated with non significant effects or mildly negative ones (with the
exception for bishops in the humanities, not surprising if we consider again patron-
age). They are inserted in our estimates as they usually protected some forms of art
or science and are a proxy for forms of power and wealth at least for the first periods
of time under study. The effect of plundering is always significant and negative. Fi-
nally, inventors seem not to be predictable in a significant way by any institutional
variable, but respond pretty well to some spatial and economic indicators (like the
population level under a Malthusian regime assumption): their small size relative to
the other two sectors might influence the result. Because our models are Poisson, for
a one unit change in the independent variables, the logs of the dependent variable is
expected to change by the respective regression coefficient, given the other predictor
variables in the model are held constant.
It is sufficient to apply ex, where x is the independent variable’s estimated co-
efficient, to asses its impact. A coefficient of ≈ 0.0035 will imply one more person
ceteris paribus, doubling it will almost double the result. A coefficient of ≈ 1.1
implies 3 times more people. The more the coefficient grows, the higher the impact.
Negative coefficients would imply a reduction in percentage over the expected num-
ber, hence a coefficient of ≈ −0.7 implies a reduction of a half.
52
5. Results
Table 5.4: Poisson regression with robust standard errors for all the birth places
Dependent variable:
All Humanities Science Inventors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban Potential 0.035∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Population 0.624∗∗∗ 0.561∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.171) (0.190) (0.191)
Sea 0.005 0.048 −0.035 −0.425
(0.260) (0.278) (0.283) (0.350)
River 0.647∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗
(0.142) (0.159) (0.185) (0.305)
Roman Road −0.624∗∗∗ −0.654∗∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗ −0.755∗∗
(0.160) (0.174) (0.216) (0.383)
Roman Hub −0.317∗∗ −0.276∗ −0.428∗∗ −0.164
(0.152) (0.166) (0.193) (0.262)
Capital 0.794∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ 0.382 −0.420
(0.265) (0.273) (0.321) (0.359)
University 0.688∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.294
(0.165) (0.172) (0.206) (0.309)
Bishop 0.073 0.298 −0.270 −0.406
(0.183) (0.200) (0.219) (0.301)
Archbishop −0.237 −0.036 −0.607∗∗ −0.371
(0.191) (0.205) (0.255) (0.378)
Plundered −0.828∗∗∗ −0.819∗∗∗ −1.051∗∗ −0.261
(0.276) (0.277) (0.492) (0.407)
Constant −3.308∗∗∗ −3.674∗∗∗ −4.614∗∗∗ −7.272∗∗∗
(0.455) (0.450) (0.546) (0.654)
Observations 2,597 2,597 2,597 2,597
Log Likelihood -3,356.734 -2,422.606 -1,477.315 -368.935
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,737.468 4,869.213 2,978.630 761.870
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 5.5: Zero-inflated poisson regression with robust standard errors over birth
place of the whole population
Dependent variable:
All Humanities Science Inventors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban Potential 0.026∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Population 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sea −0.032 −0.137 0.291 −0.057
(0.178) (0.197) (0.184) (0.290)
River 0.584∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.132) (0.144) (0.227)
Roman Road −0.340∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗ −0.231
(0.120) (0.134) (0.176) (0.311)
Roman Hub −0.249∗∗ −0.257∗ −0.209 −0.083
(0.118) (0.137) (0.157) (0.233)
Capital 1.065∗∗∗ 1.295∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗ −0.436
(0.166) (0.190) (0.294) (0.430)
University 0.661∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗∗ 0.395
(0.134) (0.160) (0.193) (0.292)
Bishop 0.204 0.427∗∗∗ 0.054 −0.448∗
(0.125) (0.138) (0.172) (0.261)
Archbishop 0.055 0.163 −0.072 −0.340
(0.168) (0.234) (0.244) (0.340)
Plundered −0.460∗∗∗ −0.491∗∗ −0.698∗ 0.329
(0.168) (0.198) (0.396) (0.327)
Constant −0.674∗∗∗ −1.240∗∗∗ −2.836∗∗∗ −3.670∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.241) (0.253) (0.468)
Observations 8,723 8,723 8,723 8,723
Log Likelihood -4737.397 -3526.176 -1969.45 -585.1312
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
We can now move to a deeper analysis. We concentrate on four reference coun-
tries: France, the Netherlands, Italy and England. This because they are rich across
the period 800-1800 in contributes.1 The table concerns only birth palaces. Death
places tend to give more weight to the capital factor but are in general less inter-
esting. For ease of exposition I omitted them but left in Appendix A both tables
for the Poisson model in order to show the concentration effect. We are more inter-
1As in the previous case, a series of Poisson models was designed, who complement the table
given here.
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ested in understanding what kind of cultural values select a cultural entrepreneur,
rather than where does he go. The second aspect is already captured by the maps
and responds to some more obvious determinants; despite the assumption of equal-
distribution, birthplaces respond to some patterns that are influenced by other fac-
tors, which we hope to capture. We add some variables for the determination of
local power, in order to appreciate the value of political inclusion:
• Commune, dummy variable indicating whether or not a city has a form of
self-governance.
• Participate in Parliament, dummy variable indicating whether or not a
city falls under an active parliament.
• Free from prince, dummy variable indicating whether or not a city is located
in a country that is classified as “free” (=1) or “prince” (=0) according to
De Long and Shleifer [2003].
The result of the regression are in Table 5.6 on the next page.
The study of the table can give us important information about the different histo-
ries, in terms of institutions and contingencies, of the countries under analysis. We
might bear in mind that the results are not always of the same quality (even though
we report the same table). We will comment on the reliability of our results time
by time, what matters here is the country specific factors and history as reflected
from the findings.
The starting case is that of Italy. In its early phases in the medieval time period,
Italian talent was captured by areas who where still connected, usually along the
routes inherited from the past, and close one to the other (the Roman road and
urban potential effects, both significant for p-values less than 5%). Local autonomy,
captured by the “commune” dummy, also plays an important role. Its magnitude
dominates the other ones by the same period. The effects of plundering and wars
have a negative effect. In the period 1300-1400 the effect of the Roman roads is
negative, while new forms of power concentrations start to emerge: areas close to
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Table 5.6: Zero-inflated Poisson regression with robust standard errors over birth
place of selected countries in different time periods. Empty columns are non con-
vergent data.
Dependent variable:
All categories
Italy United Kingdom
800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800 800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Urban Potential 0.474∗∗ −0.185 0.058∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ −0.052 0.542∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ −0.024 0.000
(0.200) (0.131) (−0.027) (0.026) (0.036) (0.185) (0.079) (0.024) (0.005)
Population 0.019 0.006 0.010∗∗∗ −0.002 0.005∗∗ −0.051 −0.005∗ −0.001 0.017∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.008) (−0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.034) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
River 0.976 0.505 0.188 −0.182 −0.213 −0.227 0.436 0.036 0.069
(0.788) (0.341) (−0.268) (0.409) (0.298) (0.873) (0.290) (0.462) (0.250)
Roman Road 2.400∗∗ −1.110∗∗ −0.474 −1.551∗∗∗ −0.395 −18.071∗∗∗ 0.221 0.892∗∗ 0.188
(0.994) (0.507) (−0.360) (0.591) (0.419) (0.517) (0.277) (0.364) (0.251)
Capital 1.502 1.225∗∗ 0.305 1.547∗∗∗ −0.260 2.294 1.941∗∗∗ 2.872∗∗∗ −12.818∗∗∗
(1.014) (0.558) (−0.440) (0.539) (0.478) (1.362) (0.522) (0.728) (4.349)
University 0.603 0.659∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ −0.871∗∗ 0.295 −18.792∗∗∗ −0.292 −0.719 0.324
(1.313) (0.322) (−0.240) (0.435) (0.310) (1.237) (0.444) (0.492) (0.292)
Bishop −0.902 0.669 −0.125 −0.163 0.788∗ 0.765 0.900∗∗∗ 0.219 0.519∗∗
(1.416) (0.442) (−0.297) (0.469) (0.437) (1.774) (0.240) (0.342) (0.246)
Commune 2.253∗∗ 0.638 0.951∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗ 2.427∗∗∗ 0.585∗ 0.348 0.217
(0.952) (0.427) (−0.255) (0.324) (0.293) (0.690) (0.319) (0.310) (0.214)
Participates in Parliament 0.000 0.088 −0.517∗ −0.267 −0.469∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.393) (−0.306) (0.276) (0.266)
Free from prince 0.714 3.352∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.026) (0.644) (−0.322)
Plundered −35.489∗∗∗ −16.870∗∗∗ −0.709∗ −11.232∗∗∗ 0.000 −1.321 0.830 0.840∗∗ 0.000
(1.395) (0.978) (−0.387) (1.183) (1.637) (0.669) (0.347)
Constant −7.331∗∗∗ −2.823∗∗∗ −1.760∗∗∗ −1.790∗∗∗ −0.044 −5.335∗∗∗ −2.127∗∗∗ 0.479 −0.102
(1.528) (1.095) (−0.683) (0.602) (1.038) (0.698) (0.548) (0.460) (0.477)
Observations 755 302 302 151 151 340 136 68 68
Log Likelihood -51.13229 -140.2328 -193.8814 -78.68818 -79.9336 -25.41026 -139.7622 -101.2053 -111.5582
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variable:
All categories
France Netherlands and Belgium
800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800 800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Urban Potential 1.184∗∗∗ 0.078 0.005 0.005 0.012∗∗∗ −0.030∗ −0.034∗ −0.023 0.010
0.339 0.090 0.056 0.056 2.150 0.016 0.018 0.018 0.019
Population 0.010 −0.001 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.001 −0.007 −0.005
0.021 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004
River 0.758 0.354 0.118 0.118 −0.186 0.532 0.524 0.858∗ 0.685∗∗
0.935 0.554 0.296 0.296 0.256 0.473 0.362 0.463 0.322
Roman Road −0.465 0.292 −0.399 −0.399 −0.021 0.316 0.486 0.182 0.083
0.842 0.490 0.275 0.275 0.230 0.318 0.306 0.292 0.309
Capital 0.232 2.204 −0.542 −0.542 −2.569∗∗ 1.279∗∗∗ 0.899∗ 1.388∗∗∗ 1.481∗∗∗
1.170 2.140 1.107 1.107 1.176 0.343 0.487 0.359 0.410
University −13.737∗∗∗ −1.019 −0.877 −0.877∗∗ −0.437 0.486 0.144 0.546 0.384
1.624 1.101 0.414 0.414 0.335 0.374 0.452 0.343 0.420
Bishop 1.351∗∗ 0.114 −0.123 −0.123 0.075 −0.569∗∗ −0.609∗∗ −0.406 −0.180
0.603 0.436 0.263 0.263 0.205 0.245 0.261 0.280 0.250
Commune 19.429∗∗∗ 0.644 0.424 0.424∗ 0.068 0.863 0.998∗ 1.267∗∗ 1.861∗∗∗
1.008 0.556 0.246 0.246 0.212 0.557 0.520 0.593 0.710
Participates in Parliament −15.291∗∗∗ 0.126 −0.073 −0.073 0.000 0.695∗ 1.047∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗ 0.001
1.436 1.138 0.595 0.595 0.403 0.330 0.373 0.428
Free from Prince −22.088∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.674∗∗ 1.421∗∗ 1.099 −0.126
2.001 1.105 0.616 0.722 0.568
Plundered 0.451 −14.326∗∗∗ −0.113 −0.113 −13.299∗∗∗ −40.044∗∗∗ −34.529∗∗∗ 0.492 0.000
0.691 0.524 0.696 0.696 1.066 1.180 1.109 0.967
Constant −6.433∗∗∗ −2.216 −0.761 −0.761 −0.387 −3.744∗∗∗ −2.959∗∗∗ −3.198∗∗∗ −2.336∗∗∗
1.318 1.571 0.791 0.791 0.474 1.121 0.687 0.728 0.577
Observations 525 210 210 105 105 234 289 271 271
Log Likelihood -70.72079 -83.73521 -168.1101 -125.6423 -150.7939 -170.3505 -171.5501 -145.4662 -165.9543
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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the capital city (in this case small city-states) or a university, as well as those in-
dependent of a prince, could flourish. It is a period of institutional growth and our
dummies seem to partially capture this effect, which in turn creates some basins of
attraction around cities who encouraged local participation and the preservation of
urban interests. The period after 1500 until 1800 has some elements that could be
emphasised: in 1700 the capital city effect is important, probably because of the ef-
fect of the activities of the papacy. If we drop Rome from the regression, the capital
city effect becomes insignificant. Communal activities are always strong predictors
of the emergence of an eminent person and other signs of autonomy equally perform
well. Universities have mixed effects depending on the period of time, and for now
should not be considered facilitators of eminence per se. The forces that seem to
favour always the selection of an eminent person are those of inclusive nature (like
“commune”) and the urban potential. Economic proxies are not too relevant (pop-
ulation).
The quality of the inference from the data about England seems to be rather
contradictory. We witness a generally positive effect of the capital city, with an
unexpected mild negative effect in 1800. This might be due to the diffusion of bet-
ter centres around London, who at the time was not a good place to be growing
in. Nonetheless, areas with the presence of local authorities like bishops, or forms
of early inclusion captured by the “commune” or “free prince” dummies, signal
positive effects over the potential insurgence of an eminent figure. The population
effect, when significant, is usually mild, while urban potential is again positive but
decreasing in time. If we consider France, the situation becomes more interesting.
The general features we observed as occasionally emerging in the data about Eng-
land, are repeated here, the capital is not a strong predictor of the birth of successful
people, nor do universities. Urban potential, population, communal practices, are
again positively correlated even if small in magnitude. France is probably better
captured by the maps of the previous section, even though it does not disproof our
general results. Finally, the Flanders are, all taken into account, substantially con-
57
5. Results
firming the general trend. The capital city here is an area of active recruitment.
Forms of participation in different periods of time are capable of delivering positive
effects and predict the emergence of eminent figures. There is one common feature
across the countries: war disrupts the possibility of cultural peaks.
The division per country per period of time is not always completely convincing,
but if we consider the magnitudes and signs as general reference points for the study,
we can insulate some common tendencies. The first one is concerned with the role
of inclusive institutions, which seem to correlate always positively with the emer-
gence of talent: cities where the burden of government was distributed, and that
usually granted forms of personal liberty, were those where the brightest minds of
their generation developed. We can presume that other talented people grew there
too. The second tendency concerns the role of capital cities, for they are not always
predictors of talent birth. Capitals in these detailed tables have mixed roles and
structures, who depend on chance and the personal histories of the grand inventors.
The statistical regularities can find a sort of final confirmation in the panel Pois-
son model of Table 5.7 on the following page. The effects that are statistically
significant in a positive way are urban potential, capital, university, commune, ac-
tive parliament. The suggestions about inclusive institutions, the mild capital city
effect in death and birth places, the role of pre-existing education structures, urban
development in terms of proximity between centres, all seem to be the most resilient
and interesting of the data. If looked in light of the historical data and heat maps
we plotted before, they pose the base for a model of talent birth and mobility which
we are going to discuss in the next section.
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Table 5.7: Conditional fixed effect Poisson panel regression with clustered errors
over birth and death place of the whole population
Dependent variable:
Birth Death
(1) (2)
Urban Potential 0.008∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(11.340) (0.013)
Population 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Capital 1.150∗∗∗ 1.320∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.309)
University 0.979∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗
(0.371) (0.377)
Bishop −0.111 −0.217
(0.279) (0.328)
Archbishop 0.524 0.681
(0.691) (0.607)
Commune 1.413∗∗∗ 1.491∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.218)
Active Parliament 0.515∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.151)
Free Prince −0.112 −0.112
(0.110) (0.156)
Plunedered −0.110 −0.198
(0.189) (0.204)
Observations 5,016 3,740
Groups 456 340
Log Likelihood -2655.56 -2161.15
Note: Bootstrap std.errors ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
5.3 A tentative model of talent in pre-industrial
Europe
The different results we collected so far, constitute a rough but solid bulk of informa-
tion of different quality of which we must make sense of. In the previous chapters
we discussed about cultural entrepreneurs, who have the ability to persuade and
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influence others and innovate in the sphere of thought. We implicitly linked cultural
entrepreneurs to the cultural enterprise they are part of, posing them as forerunners,
the representatives of the top-distribution of their sector. Part of it, yet changing
it. In order to appreciate their role in the period of time we are studying, we tried
to hint at the theories about the emergence of the industrial revolution we are dis-
cussing, as to pose a layout for their action in the economy. In particular, the
scholarly views about industrialisation are based on different perspectives: some do
focus only on Britain while others have a broader conception of what is happen-
ing in mind. On one side we presented Mokyr’s Industrial Enlightenment thesis,
which poses a great emphasis over the role of cultural values in shaping institutions
and changing the prerequisites for innovation; on the other, we presented Allen,
who claims that British industrialisation occurred as innovation driven by economic
forces, those of the salary, the cost of coal and opportunity. These two stories cannot
be dismissed by our somewhat quirky exercise, but indeed they find some support in
what we observe and are not refuted. What is more, they can be easily harmonised,
in that if Allen explains the spark the set industrialisation in motion, it is probably
the Industrial Enlightenment that fuelled and prepared it.
5.3.1 Migration and focal points
Industrial entrepreneurs move, in fact they might migrate at some point in their
life. They move to grow, to find new opportunities, or out of necessity, for exam-
ple when they are ostracised. Great thinkers face many constraints that they must
overcome. However, despite the common sense about the topic, what is the entity
of the movements of eminent people across Europe in our sample? Surprisingly, not
too high (See Figure 5.7 on page 62). People move, but usually inside their country
and, if they move permanently, they frequently move to a confining region. Mobility
is higher if they come from a relatively less developed country and usually move to-
ward countries that are at the frontier both of technology or of their art. If we look
at mobility between grand countries we see no peculiar movements, while internal
mobility is high (at least in terms of the concentration effect toward focal points in
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the capital and major cities). Prima facie, migration reinforces developing areas,
fuelling them with experts and fresh minds, who can find more opportunities where
the buzz is; at the same time it exerts a minor resource drain on stagnating coun-
tries. The effect we witness in the data is on a very limited number of minds, but
under the assumption that their concentration signals where the frontier of cultural
innovation is, the datum is relevant. If migration is for the few, then, talent in major
countries (those of the European core) is a local phenomenon. This has some curious
implications: if talent is local, then countries at the frontier have some quality such
that they are better at using their talents. These might be of institutional nature
or linked with economic potential. What is certain is that migration in our data
becomes relevant the closer we get to the XIX century (unsurprisingly, I add). If we
abstract a bit, the process of becoming a focal point is ideally self-sustaining: once
a city gets on the frontier, it captures better people and uses some of the resources
of other countries, gaining strength and reducing their competitive advantage. The
only cases that disrupt this process then are exogenous shocks or the emergence of
powerful new focal points, under the assumption of more mobility or higher distance,
which can gradually erode previous ones and become new frontiers.
A good example of this erosion process comes from the experience of Europe
in the period 1500-1600. The effects of the black death (exogenous) modified the
demography of culture, which is highly dependent on the quality of human capital,
its possibility to replicate itself (in the way Murray statistically noted), and the
institutional environment. Plagues are capable of stressing both, and at the same
time dampen economic potential, trade and other aspects that indirectly foster
creativity and cultural exchange. They somehow reset a system, and Europe at the
time was in a transitory condition, with a reduced capability of old sites to behave
as the absolute centres of cultural entrepreneurship. The new commercial routes,
a modified perspective of the world, contributed to the change of pace, while if we
accept that eminent figures act as proxies, countries such as Italy were loosing their
human capital because of an induced loss of their social capital.
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Figure 5.7: Selected migration figures between countries. Country of origin is in the rows, country of destination in columns. Total values
refer to the century total of the born into a given country and not to the sum of the people living in all the selected countries.
From\To Austria France Germany Italy UK Netherlands Belgium Tot From\To Austria France Germany Italy UK Netherlands Belgium Tot
Austria 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Austria 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
France 0 25 0 1 1 0 0 29 France 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 6
Germany 0 1 8 1 2 1 0 13 Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy 2 0 0 18 0 0 0 21 Italy 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 4
UK 0 0 0 0 19 0 0 20 UK 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 7 Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Belgium 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
From\To Austria France Germany Italy UK Netherlands Belgium Tot From\To Austria France Germany Italy UK Netherlands Belgium Tot
Austria 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France 0 47 1 1 2 1 0 52 France 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 9
Germany 2 2 32 4 0 0 0 44 Germany 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 6
Italy 1 2 0 12 1 0 0 19 Italy 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
UK 0 1 0 1 34 0 0 41 UK 0 0 0 0 12 0 0 14
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belgium 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 4 Belgium 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
From\To Austria France Germany Italy UK Netherlands Belgium Tot From\To Austria France Germany Italy UK Netherlands Belgium Tot
Austria 5 0 2 0 3 0 0 12 Austria 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
France 0 67 0 0 2 0 2 77 France 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 18
Germany 3 3 42 5 4 0 1 67 Germany 1 0 12 0 0 0 0 13
Italy 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 17 Italy 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
UK 1 3 0 0 36 0 0 47 UK 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 11
Netherlands 0 0 1 0 0 6 0 7 Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Belgium 0 3 0 0 0 0 5 8 Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
From\To Austria France Germany Italy UK Netherlands Belgium Tot From\To Austria France Germany Italy UK Netherlands Belgium Tot
Austria 9 1 1 0 0 0 0 12 Austria 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 9
France 0 110 1 2 4 1 3 125 France 0 54 0 1 2 0 3 64
Germany 6 10 84 7 3 0 0 124 Germany 4 7 48 3 3 0 0 74
Italy 1 7 1 32 1 0 0 46 Italy 0 5 1 19 0 0 0 26
UK 0 1 0 4 113 0 0 131 UK 0 0 0 3 67 0 0 76
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 4 Netherlands 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2
Belgium 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 5 Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
From\To Austria France Germany Italy UK Netherlands Belgium Tot From\To Austria France Germany Italy UK Netherlands Belgium Tot
Austria 20 0 6 2 5 0 0 43 Austria 13 0 4 1 2 0 0 27
France 0 200 1 0 2 0 2 218 France 0 117 1 0 0 0 0 123
Germany 8 10 130 9 8 0 1 195 Germany 4 7 76 4 4 0 0 115
Italy 0 5 1 38 0 0 1 46 Italy 0 5 1 21 0 0 0 27
UK 1 7 0 2 140 0 0 178 UK 0 3 0 2 99 0 0 120
Netherlands 0 1 2 0 0 16 0 22 Netherlands 0 1 1 0 0 9 0 14
Belgium 0 8 0 0 0 0 14 24 Belgium 0 5 0 0 0 0 9 16
Science Invention
1600 1600
1700 1700
1800 1800
All Humanities
1700 1700
1800 1800
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5.3.2 Institutions and shocks
The regressions we run emphasised the role of institutions and social behaviour latu
senso in capturing the best cultural entrepreneurs: our eminent people. The under-
standing of the micro-dynamics that breeds them could only come from a profound
study of their biographies, and is not part of this work. Anyhow, we could fancy
that inclusive social realities empower their members, allowing them to be rewarded
and emerge, to have contact with many perspectives about the world, while at
the same time pedagogically making them part of a greater whole where ideas can
be freely exchanged. To quote an African saying: “it takes a village to grow a child”.
Changes for the worse in institutions can then be rather painful, reducing the
probability that a community selects some of its best minds. Universities, while
attracting people and working as the alma mater of many, show in our results
a conflicting behaviour in single countries, warning us that it is not the institution
alone that can do the work. Accounts of the Oxbridge attitude and programs during
the industrial revolution should warn us of the dangers of intellectual conservatism.
The fragile mix of experience and values who are appropriate to a given period for
the expansion of a frontier, can be wiped out by the decapitation of repositories of
human capital. This form of shocks violently reduces the replication effect by simply
removing the seed that starts them.
A central aspect for the shift in the frontier from one place to another is the
co-integration of geographic areas. If information cannot move and, to a lesser
degree, is not standardised, focal points cannot shift easily from one area to another.
Intuitively, the absence of mobility in people or at least in ideas, does not allow a
new cultural enterprise to even try its own version of the production of knowledge.
Routines in innovation need some sort of communication to be imitated. Therefore,
the evidence of the divergence in the nature of urban integration in Europe as in
Bosker et al. [2013], is part of the virtues that set Europe apart in its cultural
development. In a sense, an hypothesis worth testing is whether the separation
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between the Muslim and Christian world, made western improvements a well kept
secret to the rest of the world. Finally, an interconnected Europe can favour a sort
of passing of the torch, shifting the state of knowledge from one area to another and
thus reducing the potential loss in knowledge caused by negative exogenous shocks.
Such torch is that of Prometheus.1
5.4 The historical foundation of the Industrial En-
lightenment
At this point we have all the categories for a narrative of the data. It borrows many
impressions from several authors and is not revolutionary. However, it sheds some
light on the importance of the history of culture, its continuous nature and interplay
with other forces.
5.4.1 Phase I: From a scattered few to clustered many
The first phase that emerges from the data reflects a primitive Europe, with frag-
mented polities and no structured behaviour. Some areas have access to major
powers and are in contact with them. The pace of innovation, signalled by the
increase in the people participating in the cultural pursuit, is slow, and technical
and scientific innovators limited to a handful. It’s a time, however, where the first
seeds of what would then become the foci of innovation are set. Interestingly, Spain
is rich in contributions, but it is so in the southern parts, which are Muslim. The
reconquista will eradicate the previous cultural equilibrium, acting as a powerful
negative shock. It is indeed one of the most interesting shocks in the history of
Europe, as it separates the region from its Muslim tradition and, because of the
lack of communication between the Christian world and the Arabic one, de facto
eliminates the people who favour the replication of eminence across time. In fact,
1It is interesting to note that technology is not exogenous to the phenomenon: the printing
press, for example, played a great role in allowing a preservation and dissemination of culture. In
this sense it improved the chances of survival of ideas beyond their region of origin, this in turn
widened the pool of potential instruments that industrial entrepreneurs could use.
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for all the period 1300-1400, the Iberian peninsula is not capable of retaining its
talents.
5.4.2 Phase II: From clusters to systems
The period subsequent to the initial setting of the European core, which is severed
from its Iberian relative, is characterised by the first wave of clusters around some
focal points. The second one is after the black death and the turbulent period
of 1500. Italy and the Flanders are initially the most prolific regions of Europe,
together with Paris, who starts to become a local cultural power. From this point
on Paris is always playing an important role. It is a period of associative trades
and of the development and birth of Guilds, who even if debated in their long-
standing contribution toward development. The clustering phase is paralleled by
the emergence of the nation state, which starts to unify and connect in a more
systematic ways different centres across its borders, and between them. A bare-bone
level of high standing innovation diffuses in Europe, but the occasional innovator is
not sufficient to justify the presence of a focal innovation area.
5.4.3 Why not Spain? The importance of culture and insti-
tutions
We already noted that payment alone is not capable of attracting or selecting talent.
An emblematic case is Spain: after the reconquista it is no longer capable of any
outstanding contribution, even though it was one of the financially richest countries
in Europe at least for the period 1500-1600. If we look at Figure 5.2 on page 43,
there is probably a positive effect of wealth, but is completely vanished in 1700
with no resilience effect. Additionally, the nature of innovation in Spain is not
as strong as that of less financially fortunate countries. A conjecture that might
explain this is that culture is indeed sensitive to social and institutional determinants
rather than merely financial ones. Even more, culture might reasonably be attracted
by wealth, but to acquire resilience and take roots in a region it needs something
more appealing to cultural entrepreneurs: ideas, freedom, and a stream of new
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projects. Spain was incapable of providing them for some precise reasons: firstly,
the abundance of silver completely disrupted incentives and the productive system
of the country, which had already renounced to one of its most prolific classes,
the moriscos, thus making any interaction between the production strata and the
scientific elite impossible. Secondly, Spain was haunted by an oppressive form of
religion, whose most eminent manifestation is the so called Spanish Inquisition,
which created an ambient unfavourable for the expression of free-thought. The
experience of protestant countries and the mix between their practical values and
the ascending bourgeoisie (different from the enriched nobility of Spain) are a too
well known and debated story to be presented here. Nonetheless, the example of
Spain reinforces our idea that cultural excellence is not simply the consequence of
money and wealth: knowledge and creativity can be bought up to a point.
5.4.4 France and England in 1700-1850: footprints of Indus-
trial Enlightenment
We now come to the point. For much of the work we have shown the results that
come from employing the index, describing the map of cultural progression across
Europe. We suggested the idea of a passing of knowledge across space and time,
which diffused and tickled down to different social strata. They show a geography
of Europe as an active land, where ideas circulated and found new avenues for their
sedimentation and evolution. At this point we can concentrate on France and Eng-
land in the period 1700-1850. It is certainly a good thing to concentrate on them
because of their outstanding cultural record in the period under study. If we look
at data at city level, there usually is a mild coexistence of sectors in a given ratio:
the arts are more frequent, science comes as second in size, and technology is rather
small. England in the period 1700-1850 has some interesting exceptions: Edinburgh,
Plymouth, Belfast and so on are all characterised by a predominance of scientists
and inventors, in contrast with other European cities (see Table 5.2 on page 49 and
Table 5.1 on page 48). At the contrary, even though Paris is still the capital of
cultural enterprise in Europe, France lags behind the United Kingdom in terms of
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technical activity for the period under study. Only at the end of the century the
two converge. This is consistent with the heat-map of the period, were the areas
surrounding Manchester and Edinburgh were dense in scientists and inventors. This
finding is supportive of the view from Mokyr that England was peculiar in its cul-
tural conformation at the time, and was so only for the limited period of 1700-1850,
because after that a new phase of industrialisation started in synergy with the rest
of Europe. Innovators were born in different areas and then moved to specific places
where the first steps of innovation started. This capability of innovators of involving
themselves with the spirit of the time, seems more in line with Mokyr than Allen.
It might have been true that economic factors started the engines of the revolution,
but the peculiar geography of culture in England and Scotland was indeed well in
tune when that happened.
Enlightenment widened the number of those that participated in the pursuit of
knowledge, useful or not, creating and increasing the number of people taking up
the role of cultural entrepreneurs. As today super gurus are the top of the iceberg of
industrial realities where a thousand lesser firms compete, the same might be true for
cultural super-stars. We can pose that there exist a barrier to become entrepreneur,
a sort of cost of entrance (education, the learning of an art, and so on). Then the
enlightenment reduced the cost of entrance to specific sectors and at the same time
harmonised the different spheres of human pursuit. It set some new paradigm and
opened up novel trajectories that became part of the agenda of a multitude, while
before they were only of a few. The period 1700-1850 is probably the turning point
between a solitary search of knowledge, and today collective research efforts.
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Conclusions
Reading the history of Europe through the lens of talent and human accomplishment
can be a rewarding exercise. By showing where communities were capable of select-
ing and attracting the best talents of their age, an index based on great innovators
is capable of giving an additional measure of the forces working in shaping culture.
Much as the grand entrepreneurs of today hi-tech firms can be found in specific
areas of the world, from Singapore to the Silicon Valley, where they co-operate with
others to produce new technology, or like scientists working in some internationally
led projects that attract the best of them in a valley of Switzerland or in a desert
in New Mexico, talent in the past reacted to the opportunities it could find and
clustered in areas which were at the frontiers of knowledge, working with countless
others to the great discoveries of the time.
This study has tried to draw a map of innovation, which we found to be reactive
to freedom and to inclusive institutions. We theorised a pattern of diffusion of the
capability of selecting great innovators across time, and a peculiar property of local
resilience in the concentration of agents possessing extraordinary capability. Indeed,
talent attracts talent and only shocks of exogenous nature or some externalities
coming from specific paths of innovation seem to be capable of interrupting a self-
sustaining process of replication. This is the case of Italy, which was the source of
much of European genius in the period 800-1500, but gradually lost its pre-eminence
in favour of continental Europe and England. The role of France, and in particular
Paris, as the pulsing hearth of European innovation after 1500 is confirmed by the
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data and correlates well with the impression of the country as spiritual father of the
Enlightenment. However, England is in terms of innovation more active than France
for the period 1700-1850, which seems to corroborate the ideas of Mokyr. Further
studies could look at the connection in our dataset between different innovators, as
to test the presence of an “Enlightenment factor” in the behaviour we observed. We
cannot refute nor confirm the theories of Allen or Mokyr, yet they both find a place
in our study and in the historical impressions we have about the period: a good
result for the index.
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Poisson regression with robust standard errors over death place of the whole popu-
lation
Dependent variable:
All Humanities Science Inventors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban Potential 0.041∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Population 0.754∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 1.122∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.192) (0.175) (0.187)
Sea −0.195 −0.115 −0.401 −0.317
(0.342) (0.367) (0.371) (0.464)
River 0.808∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗
(0.198) (0.214) (0.255) (0.383)
Roman Road −0.406∗ −0.396 −0.453∗ −0.341
(0.228) (0.252) (0.265) (0.523)
Roman Hub −0.051 −0.095 0.026 0.196
(0.198) (0.214) (0.267) (0.302)
Capital 1.440∗∗∗ 1.544∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.280) (0.275) (0.358)
University 0.791∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 0.276
(0.188) (0.189) (0.263) (0.309)
Bishop −0.126 0.279 −0.850∗∗∗ −0.389
(0.266) (0.274) (0.323) (0.426)
Archbishop −0.299 0.134 −1.074∗∗∗ −0.694∗
(0.252) (0.257) (0.323) (0.408)
Plundered −0.962∗∗∗ −0.979∗∗ −1.209∗∗ −0.110
(0.323) (0.404) (0.487) (0.515)
Constant −4.288∗∗∗ −4.680∗∗∗ −5.591∗∗∗ −8.360∗∗∗
(0.492) (0.515) (0.557) (0.736)
Observations 2,597 2,597 2,597 2,597
Log Likelihood -3,589.698 -2,523.083 -1,464.814 -355.720
Akaike Inf. Crit. 7,203.396 5,070.165 2,953.628 735.440
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Poisson regression with robust standard errors over birth place of selected countries
in different time periods (birth)
Dependent variable:
All categories
Italy United Kingdom
800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800 800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Urban Potential 2.378 −0.369∗∗ 0.019 0.144 −0.017 −0.000 20.531 −0.543 −0.243 −0.0003
(−50.156) (−0.154) (−0.109) (−0.144) (−0.032) (0.035) (−67.049) (0.918) (−0.731) (−0.002)
Population −2.103 0.943∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 0.132 1.390∗∗∗ −0.000 −7.653 0.615 2.503 0.543∗∗∗
(12.136) (−0.345) (−0.168) (−0.248) (−0.280) (−4.184) (33.717) (−1.774) (2.957) (−0.071)
River 3.928 0.573∗∗∗ −0.173 −0.392∗∗∗ −0.013 −15.708 −16.322∗∗∗ −6.809 0.092∗∗∗
(−25.769) (−0.124) (0.238) (0.076) (0.047) (1.427) (−31.921) (−2.991) (−8.633) (−0.021)
Roman Road 0.192 −1.734∗∗∗ −0.240∗∗ −1.866∗∗∗ −0.457∗∗∗ −4.718 18.818∗∗ 0.619 0.136∗∗∗
(9.290) (−0.171) (−0.115) (−0.067) (0.074) (0.473) (18.586) (−9.397) (−1.923) (−0.008)
Capital 9.644 1.416∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗ −0.939∗∗∗ 0.000 35.432 0.609 −5.420 0.805∗∗∗
(−91.820) (−0.138) (−0.161) (−0.385) (0.149) (2.846) (−71.057) (3.715) (−11.799) (0.289)
University 4.875 0.194 0.880∗∗∗ −0.724∗∗∗ 0.050 1.313 −2.123 0.561∗∗∗
(−10.920) (−0.184) (0.169) (0.127) (0.135) (0.035) (85.535) (−2.352) (−2.364) (−0.002)
Bishop −4.715 1.676∗∗∗ −0.259 −0.109 1.321∗∗∗ 0.000 −18.400 19.825 −1.175∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗
(62.082) (−0.146) (−0.319) (−0.473) (−0.492) (0.796) (16.180) (−20.822) (0.217) (−0.038)
Commune 15.014 0.387∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.992∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 25.303∗∗∗ 9.078 39.220∗∗∗ −1.757∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(82.159) (0.217) (0.283) (0.265) (0.029) (−0.750) (−63.329) (−3.999) (−0.262) (−0.037)
Participates in Parliament 0.625∗∗∗ −0.490 −0.354 −0.067 20.572
(13.447) (−0.208) (−0.315) (−0.424) (−0.315) (0.816) (−67.049) (0.918) (−1.811) (−0.002)
Free from prince 3.346 2.548∗∗∗ 0.870
(78.403) (0.261) (−0.579) (−0.087) (−0.032) (−0.225) (20.730) (0.657) (−0.731) (0.00003)
Plundered −25.321 −0.185 −12.831∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗
(−50.156) (−0.154) (−0.179) (−0.144) (0.001) (−0.696) (−10.425) (−1.255) (0.069) (0.0002)
Constant −31.842 −4.584∗ −4.409∗ −3.091 −6.240∗∗∗ −25.303∗∗ −89.117 −39.764 4.915 −1.387∗∗∗
(218.672) (2.690) (2.273) (3.425) (2.147) (10.562) (223.528) (−35.571) (9.274) (0.341)
Observations 82 77 123 69 137 13 10 12 12 66
Log Likelihood -13.925 -71.090 -121.030 -48.158 -69.434 -1.000 -4.921 -13.547 -20.405 -110.581
Akaike Inf. Crit. 49.850 164.181 266.060 118.316 158.868 14.000 27.841 45.094 60.811 239.163
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variable:
All categories
France Netherlands
800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800 800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Urban Potential 1.382∗∗∗ 0.113 −0.018 −0.005∗ 0.031∗∗∗ −0.000 1, 405.024 0.079 0.078 −0.055
(0.017) (−0.183) (−0.083) (−0.003) (−0.004) (−177, 367.800) (0.112) (−0.130) (−0.167)
Population 1.635 −0.443 0.859∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 1, 711.428 0.611 −0.014 1.282
(−3.386) (−0.748) (−0.309) (−0.114) (−0.044) (−204, 687.400) (−2.481) (−2.513) (−0.996)
River 0.527 1.646 0.321 0.461∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ 1.592 19.116∗∗∗ −0.798
(−4.015) (−1.358) (−0.218) (−0.201) (−0.049) (−305, 423.000) (−1.757) (−3.902) (1.128)
Roman Road −17.429∗∗∗ 0.533 0.153 −0.981∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 2, 417.725 −0.099 −40.207∗∗∗ 0.516∗
(−3.360) (−0.624) (0.178) (0.003) (−0.031) (−177, 367.800) (0.636) (3.361) (−0.270)
Capital 0.084 19.222∗∗∗ 2.249∗∗ 1.433∗∗∗ 2.576∗∗∗ 0.576 −19.511∗∗∗ −1.363
(3.485) (1.581) (1.007) (0.270) (0.111) (17, 928.560) (3.208) (6.466) (0.874)
University −21.371∗∗∗ −17.089∗∗∗ −1.203∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗ −0.486∗∗∗ 0.663 21.861∗∗∗ −0.003
(3.711) (−0.014) (0.016) (0.036) (−0.010) (20, 671.230) (1.869) (−1.307) (−0.195)
Bishop 0.995 0.089 −0.515∗ 0.249∗∗ −0.019∗ −1.130 −18.373∗∗∗ 0.303
(−2.597) (−0.636) (−0.301) (−0.113) (−0.011) (30, 867.610) (1.412) (−0.249) (−1.938)
Commune 17.161∗∗∗ 0.600 1.334∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.001 16.355∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.550) (−0.236) (0.003) (0.007) (−204, 687.400) (0.112) (−0.130) (−1.537)
Participates in Parliament 0.229∗∗∗ 1.178 −0.862∗∗∗ 17.796∗∗∗
(−1.351) (−0.010) (−1.069) (−0.062) (−0.004) (20, 671.230) (0.014) (0.019) (−0.048)
Free from prince −19.710∗∗∗
(−1.125) (−0.500) (−0.299) (−0.196) (0.0002) (23, 906.110) (−0.106) (−0.095) (−0.167)
Plundered −15.426∗∗∗ −17.520∗∗∗ −0.103 −15.530∗∗∗
(0.017) (−0.183) (−0.083) (−0.003) (−0.00005) (35, 608.720) (−0.038) (−0.019) (0.005)
Constant −12.436 −2.911 −5.104 −1.930∗∗∗ −2.168∗∗∗ −23.303 −14, 134.550 −4.172 −22.856 −36.079∗∗∗
(16.565) (4.886) (3.345) (0.706) (0.303) (1, 755, 183.000) (6.772) (19.343) (7.771)
Observations 86 61 77 65 97 2 5 30 19 19
Log Likelihood -21.675 -41.648 -75.136 -76.132 -145.635 -0.000 -1.000 -36.182 -5.207 -18.855
Akaike Inf. Crit. 65.349 105.295 172.272 174.264 309.270 4.000 10.000 88.364 26.414 57.709
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Poisson regression with robust standard errors over death place of selected countries
in different time periods (death)
Dependent variable:
All categories
Italy United Kingdom
800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800 800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Urban Potential −0.443 −0.320 −0.206 0.087 0.084 −0.000 11.727 43.371∗∗∗ −6.632∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(−0.673) (−0.283) (−0.129) (−0.259) (−0.056) (0.035) (−35.295) (−1.294) (−3.849) (−0.003)
Population −1.286 0.876 1.360∗∗∗ 0.811 1.552∗∗∗ −0.000 81.342 −81.959∗∗∗ 94.440∗∗∗ −0.064
(−4.289) (−0.932) (−0.240) (−0.769) (−0.484) (−4.184) (−310.508) (2.456) (−3.466) (−0.111)
River 0.151∗∗ 1.022 0.723∗∗∗ −0.204 1.730∗∗∗ −35.625 −96.395∗∗∗ −224.614∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(−0.075) (−0.784) (0.009) (0.251) (0.159) (1.427) (43.045) (2.968) (−16.378) (−0.022)
Roman Road −0.480 −0.814 0.526 −19.071∗∗∗ −1.466∗∗ 13.965 136.649∗∗∗ −46.573∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
(−0.716) (−0.704) (−0.389) (0.564) (−0.731) (0.473) (−50.309) (−4.039) (2.975) (−0.071)
Capital 1.862∗∗∗ 1.458∗∗∗ −0.269 1.850∗∗∗ −0.324 −0.000 −100.063 240.802∗∗∗ −296.930∗∗∗ 3.090∗∗∗
(−0.302) (0.240) (−0.164) (−0.524) (0.451) (2.846) (457.098) (−7.091) (−2.585) (0.394)
University −17.883∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗ 1.571∗∗∗ −0.108 −0.198 −110.083∗∗∗ −46.468∗∗ 2.109∗∗∗
(−0.064) (−0.301) (0.031) (0.465) (−0.183) (0.035) (−15.602) (3.307) (−19.680) (−0.067)
Bishop −0.549 0.531 −0.674∗∗∗ 0.412 0.221∗∗ 0.000 9.317 89.642∗∗∗ −62.816∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(−4.766) (−0.707) (−0.187) (−1.337) (−0.091) (0.796) (77.809) (−2.675) (17.579) (−0.072)
Commune 21.716∗∗∗ 0.566 1.358∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.000 −7.114 −116.528∗∗∗ −20.140∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗
(1.680) (0.630) (0.177) (−0.076) (−0.294) (−0.750) (−178.371) (2.258) (−9.065) (−0.118)
Participates in Parliament 1.025∗∗ −1.368∗∗∗ −0.125 0.807∗∗ 50.719
(2.774) (−0.434) (−0.468) (−0.833) (−0.346) (0.816) (−35.295) (−1.294) (−36.142) (−0.003)
Free from prince 0.683 1.645 −0.085
(0.647) (1.516) (−0.705) (−0.856) (−0.056) (−0.225) (22.125) (13.060) (−3.849) (0.00002)
Plundered −18.759∗∗∗ 0.132 0.112 43.518∗∗∗
(−0.673) (−0.283) (−0.142) (−0.259) (0.001) (−0.696) (−25.496) (−24.791) (0.259) (0.0002)
Constant −16.237 −3.716 −3.241 −5.502 −9.477∗∗∗ −25.303∗∗ −275.328 −34.680∗∗∗ 77.288 −1.081∗
(16.414) (5.378) (3.001) (7.927) (3.600) (10.562) (949.248) (2.128) (72.425) (0.641)
Observations 82 77 123 69 137 13 10 12 12 66
Log Likelihood -22.937 -87.134 -116.376 -35.004 -75.379 -0.000 -4.136 -10.338 -11.560 -126.395
Akaike Inf. Crit. 67.873 196.268 256.752 92.008 170.759 12.000 26.271 38.675 43.119 270.791
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Dependent variable:
All categories
France Netherlands
800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800 800-1200 1300-1400 1500-1600 1700 1800
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Urban Potential −0.443 −0.320 −0.206 0.087 0.084 −0.000 11.727 43.371∗∗∗ −6.632∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(−0.673) (−0.283) (−0.129) (−0.259) (−0.056) (0.035) (−35.295) (−1.294) (−3.849) (−0.003)
Population −1.286 0.876 1.360∗∗∗ 0.811 1.552∗∗∗ −0.000 81.342 −81.959∗∗∗ 94.440∗∗∗ −0.064
(−4.289) (−0.932) (−0.240) (−0.769) (−0.484) (−4.184) (−310.508) (2.456) (−3.466) (−0.111)
River 0.151∗∗ 1.022 0.723∗∗∗ −0.204 1.730∗∗∗ −35.625 −96.395∗∗∗ −224.614∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(−0.075) (−0.784) (0.009) (0.251) (0.159) (1.427) (43.045) (2.968) (−16.378) (−0.022)
Roman Road −0.480 −0.814 0.526 −19.071∗∗∗ −1.466∗∗ 13.965 136.649∗∗∗ −46.573∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
(−0.716) (−0.704) (−0.389) (0.564) (−0.731) (0.473) (−50.309) (−4.039) (2.975) (−0.071)
Capital 1.862∗∗∗ 1.458∗∗∗ −0.269 1.850∗∗∗ −0.324 −0.000 −100.063 240.802∗∗∗ −296.930∗∗∗ 3.090∗∗∗
(−0.302) (0.240) (−0.164) (−0.524) (0.451) (2.846) (457.098) (−7.091) (−2.585) (0.394)
University −17.883∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗ 1.571∗∗∗ −0.108 −0.198 −110.083∗∗∗ −46.468∗∗ 2.109∗∗∗
(−0.064) (−0.301) (0.031) (0.465) (−0.183) (0.035) (−15.602) (3.307) (−19.680) (−0.067)
Bishop −0.549 0.531 −0.674∗∗∗ 0.412 0.221∗∗ 0.000 9.317 89.642∗∗∗ −62.816∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(−4.766) (−0.707) (−0.187) (−1.337) (−0.091) (0.796) (77.809) (−2.675) (17.579) (−0.072)
Commune 21.716∗∗∗ 0.566 1.358∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.000 −7.114 −116.528∗∗∗ −20.140∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗
(1.680) (0.630) (0.177) (−0.076) (−0.294) (−0.750) (−178.371) (2.258) (−9.065) (−0.118)
Participates in Parliament 1.025∗∗ −1.368∗∗∗ −0.125 0.807∗∗ 50.719
(2.774) (−0.434) (−0.468) (−0.833) (−0.346) (0.816) (−35.295) (−1.294) (−36.142) (−0.003)
Free from prince 0.683 1.645 −0.085
(0.647) (1.516) (−0.705) (−0.856) (−0.056) (−0.225) (22.125) (13.060) (−3.849) (0.00002)
Plundered −18.759∗∗∗ 0.132 0.112 43.518∗∗∗
(−0.673) (−0.283) (−0.142) (−0.259) (0.001) (−0.696) (−25.496) (−24.791) (0.259) (0.0002)
Constant −16.237 −3.716 −3.241 −5.502 −9.477∗∗∗ −25.303∗∗ −275.328 −34.680∗∗∗ 77.288 −1.081∗
(16.414) (5.378) (3.001) (7.927) (3.600) (10.562) (949.248) (2.128) (72.425) (0.641)
Observations 82 77 123 69 137 13 10 12 12 66
Log Likelihood -22.937 -87.134 -116.376 -35.004 -75.379 -0.000 -4.136 -10.338 -11.560 -126.395
Akaike Inf. Crit. 67.873 196.268 256.752 92.008 170.759 12.000 26.271 38.675 43.119 270.791
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Scientists in 1700
Dependent variable:
Birth Death Birth Death Birth Death Birth Death
Italian Scientists English Scientists French Scientists Netherlands’ Scientists
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Urban Potential 0.144 0.427 −24.059 −3.114 0.011 0.131 0.078 −0.000
(−0.453) (−0.385) (−36.834) (−6.444) (−0.009) (−0.271) (−0.130) (−0.060)
Population 0.029 1.114∗∗∗ 108.165 79.335∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 1.126 −0.014 0.000
(−1.893) (−0.391) (161.670) (7.961) (−0.184) (−1.388) (−2.513) (−0.977)
River −0.563∗ −1.373∗∗∗ −299.042 −140.977∗∗ 0.677∗∗ −0.678 19.116∗∗∗ −0.000
(0.320) (0.417) (−442.619) (−67.198) (−0.338) (−2.319) (0.932) (−0.067)
Roman Road −1.028 −18.892∗∗∗ −23.709 −39.552∗∗∗ −1.492∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗∗ −40.207∗∗∗ 0.000
(2.147) (0.900) (−33.367) (−2.051) (0.266) (−0.453) (3.361) (−0.260)
Capital 1.015 2.535∗ −397.778 −216.773∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗ 3.057 −40.813∗∗∗ −0.000
(−0.687) (−1.318) (−600.133) (−50.975) (0.346) (1.888) (6.466) (1.315)
University 0.295 0.875∗∗ −56.089 −17.700 −0.006 2.616∗∗∗ 21.861∗∗∗ −0.000
(1.094) (0.366) (−75.183) (−41.200) (0.032) (−0.373) (−1.307) (0.655)
Bishop 18.013∗∗∗ 2.843∗ 13.321 −86.628∗∗∗ 0.280 1.069 −18.373∗∗∗ −0.000
(−2.575) (−1.675) (27.385) (22.817) (−0.254) (−2.773) (−0.249) (−0.605)
Commune 1.382 −0.119 −2.449 −1.846 −0.006 −1.267∗∗∗
(1.667) (−0.680) (4.301) (−22.327) (0.026) (−0.188) (−0.130) (−0.060)
Participates in Parliament −0.764 −0.172 −1.319∗∗∗ −0.010
(−1.088) (0.107) (−40.762) (−40.166) (0.040) (2.333) (0.019) (0.010)
Free from prince
(−0.995) (−3.631) (−36.834) (−6.444) (−0.366) (−3.975) (−0.095) (−0.049)
Plundered −15.924∗∗∗ 1.356∗∗∗ −27.962∗∗∗ 65.858∗∗∗ −14.813∗∗∗ −14.260∗∗∗
(−0.453) (−0.385) (3.819) (0.380) (−0.009) (−0.271) (−0.019) (−0.012)
Constant −22.175 −14.885 250.120 −22.587 −2.637∗∗ −8.618 −22.856∗∗ −25.303∗∗∗
(14.096) (9.650) (366.054) (133.975) (1.171) (11.285) (9.676) (4.403)
Observations 69 69 12 12 65 65 19 19
Log Likelihood -20.278 -15.417 -12.338 -8.061 -49.374 -18.943 -4.207 -0.000
Akaike Inf. Crit. 62.555 52.834 44.677 36.123 120.748 59.886 24.414 16.000
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Inventors in 1700
Dependent variable:
Birth Death Birth Death Birth Death Birth Death
Italian Inventor English Inventor French Inventor Netherlands’ Inventor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Urban Potential −2.553∗ 0.071 −3.677 −3.844 −0.070∗∗∗ 0.374 −0.000 0.057
(−1.494) (−0.301) (−4.500) (−4.901) (−0.021) (−0.842) (−0.060) (−0.115)
Population −13.259∗∗∗ −1.166 −47.964 −23.013 1.550∗∗∗ 5.578 0.000 1.377
(−3.720) (−1.797) (36.265) (32.878) (−0.414) (−14.086) (−0.977) (−3.592)
River −16.953∗∗∗ 0.680 108.991 42.044 0.147 −5.934 −0.000 18.566∗∗∗
(1.710) (0.973) (−97.038) (−92.475) (−2.181) (15.235) (−0.067) (0.743)
Roman Road −6.869∗∗∗ −0.253 2.788 −24.362∗ −18.732∗∗∗ −25.923 0.000 −18.934∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.215) (−11.227) (−14.521) (−1.046) (15.788) (−0.260) (1.174)
Capital −6.846∗ 27.283∗∗∗ 169.010 80.747 −2.020∗∗ 9.584 −0.000 −21.078∗∗∗
(−4.098) (1.090) (−124.563) (−116.105) (0.883) (37.576) (1.315) (5.690)
University 21.095∗∗∗ 1.106 −16.585 −22.004 −1.001∗∗∗ −16.983 −0.000 −0.856
(0.356) (0.866) (−23.651) (−24.834) (0.290) (−12.129) (0.655) (1.824)
Bishop −8.041∗∗∗ 22.596∗∗∗ 19.195 11.670 0.968 0.364∗∗∗ −0.000 −18.620∗∗∗
(1.361) (−3.418) (−13.913) (−9.101) (−0.638) (−0.014) (−0.605) (0.886)
Commune 26.160∗∗∗ −24.426∗∗∗ 16.891 11.298 1.071 −1.857
(4.106) (0.344) (−16.733) (−18.798) (−1.950) (4.928) (−0.060) (−0.115)
Participates in Parliament −14.112∗∗∗ 0.417 16.897∗∗∗ 16.957∗
(−3.375) (−1.402) (−6.575) (−14.992) (0.325) (10.034) (0.010) (0.019)
Free from prince
(−0.613) (1.643) (−4.500) (−4.901) (−3.863) (−7.205) (−0.049) (−0.093)
Plundered 32.044∗∗∗ 1.250∗∗∗ −19.518∗∗∗ −13.422∗∗∗ −17.739∗∗∗ −19.895∗∗∗
(−1.494) (−0.301) (0.381) (0.363) (−0.021) (−0.842) (−0.012) (−0.047)
Constant 44.519 −47.732∗∗∗ 29.954 42.156 −23.688∗∗∗ −39.873 −25.303∗∗∗ −26.300∗∗
(31.275) (12.645) (68.516) (78.426) (5.518) (44.316) (4.403) (12.933)
Observations 69 69 12 12 65 65 19 19
Log Likelihood -1.000 -1.000 -6.496 -5.325 -21.010 -7.703 -0.000 -2.653
Akaike Inf. Crit. 24.000 24.000 32.992 30.649 64.020 37.406 16.000 21.305
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Scientists in 1800
Dependent variable:
Birth Death Birth Death Birth Death Birth Death
Italian Scientists English Scientists French Scientists Netherlands’ Scientists
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Urban Potential 0.021 0.058 −0.048∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ −0.009 0.018 −0.060 0.030
(−0.041) (−0.059) (−0.018) (−0.003) (−0.018) (−0.136) (−0.152) (−0.986)
Population 0.528 1.135∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.053 0.769∗∗∗ 0.155 1.220 −0.339
(−0.797) (−0.653) (−0.133) (−0.154) (−0.174) (−0.805) (−1.076) (−6.052)
River 0.297∗ 1.527∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ −0.456 −0.752 17.323∗∗∗
(0.161) (−0.019) (−0.018) (−0.021) (−0.256) (−1.174) (1.144) (5.282)
Roman Road −17.862∗∗∗ −1.018 −0.062 −0.033 0.229∗∗∗ 0.025 0.025 1.103
(−0.196) (0.961) (−0.040) (−0.127) (0.011) (−0.200) (−0.414) (−4.775)
Capital −1.061 1.129 0.814 2.447∗∗∗ 2.380∗∗∗ 5.065∗ −1.279 1.690
(0.982) (0.736) (0.520) (0.533) (0.398) (2.952) (1.058) (1.684)
University 0.355 −0.405∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 2.445∗∗∗ −1.078∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ −0.273∗ 2.327
(0.360) (0.125) (−0.068) (−0.079) (0.104) (−0.004) (−0.164) (7.179)
Bishop 0.181 0.803∗∗∗ −0.229∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.192∗ 1.245∗∗∗ 0.357 0.368
(−0.769) (−0.300) (−0.126) (−0.094) (−0.105) (0.398) (−1.929) (−16.740)
Commune 0.756∗∗∗ 1.062∗∗ 0.057 1.027∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 2.237∗∗∗ 16.383∗∗∗ 17.838∗∗∗
(0.042) (−0.539) (0.035) (−0.129) (−0.058) (−0.783) (−1.305) (−3.683)
Participates in Parliament 0.271 1.349∗∗∗ 17.842∗∗∗ 17.265∗∗∗
(−1.160) (−0.260) (−0.018) (−0.003) (−0.018) (−0.136) (−0.047) (4.987)
Free from prince
(−0.041) (−0.059) (0.0005) (0.00003) (0.001) (0.005) (−0.152) (−0.986)
Plundered
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0002) (−0.0001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.029)
Constant −4.727 −9.690∗∗ −0.546 −2.342∗∗∗ −3.844∗∗∗ −4.877 −35.858∗∗∗ −54.294
(4.273) (4.296) (0.940) (0.836) (1.349) (7.329) (9.300) (42.303)
Observations 137 137 66 66 97 97 19 19
Log Likelihood -33.832 -28.788 -78.950 -82.133 -70.676 -44.250 -17.402 -12.405
Akaike Inf. Crit. 87.665 77.576 175.900 182.267 159.353 106.499 54.804 44.810
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Inventors in 1800
Dependent variable:
Birth Death Birth Death Birth Death Birth Death
Italian Inventor English Inventor French Inventor Netherlands’ Inventor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Urban Potential 1.079∗∗ −1.013 −0.078 0.015 0.082∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.000
(−0.447) (−1.362) (−0.062) (−0.012) (−0.034) (0.013) (−0.268) (−0.268)
Population 21.487∗∗∗ −0.946 0.969∗∗∗ 0.469 0.308 −0.068 0.000 0.000
(−5.751) (−2.210) (−0.224) (−0.694) (−0.775) (−4.404) (−0.416) (−0.416)
River −8.858∗∗ 0.252 −0.630∗ 1.450 0.311 −2.910 −0.000 −0.000
(−3.682) (−1.287) (−0.363) (−1.479) (−0.572) (−2.796) (−1.088) (−1.088)
Roman Road 14.099∗∗ 1.069∗ 0.174 0.382 −0.665∗∗∗ −0.504 0.000 0.000
(−6.113) (0.592) (0.158) (−0.894) (−0.048) (2.639) (0.446) (0.446)
Capital −33.291∗∗∗ 11.669 −1.045 1.507 20.338∗∗∗ 5.554 −0.000 −0.000
(5.984) (−11.580) (1.167) (2.587) (2.387) (15.972) (0.435) (0.435)
University 10.491∗∗∗ 7.459 0.053 0.358 −17.046∗∗∗ 0.837 0.000 0.000
(−1.348) (8.268) (−0.407) (−0.599) (−0.220) (1.952) (0.022) (0.022)
Bishop 25.329∗∗∗ −8.407 0.561∗∗ 0.794∗ 0.851∗∗ 0.834 0.000 0.000
(−3.108) (−7.631) (−0.257) (−0.418) (0.359) (3.263) (−0.702) (−0.702)
Commune 6.483∗∗∗ 8.225 0.047 −0.976∗∗∗ −0.588 1.648 −0.000 −0.000
(1.262) (7.704) (−0.172) (−0.329) (0.598) (2.269) (−4.937) (−4.937)
Participates in Parliament −2.320 10.783 −0.000 −0.000
(−3.220) (−12.993) (−0.062) (−0.012) (−0.034) (0.013) (−1.861) (−1.861)
Free from prince
(−0.447) (−1.362) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.002) (−0.268) (−0.268)
Plundered
(0.007) (0.044) (−0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (−0.027) (0.010) (0.010)
Constant −159.469∗∗∗ −13.682 −2.322 −4.410 −5.307 −6.033 −25.303 −25.303
(38.443) (47.810) (2.635) (4.695) (3.518) (10.073) (16.509) (16.509)
Observations 137 137 66 66 97 97 19 19
Log Likelihood -1.000 -1.000 -34.850 -33.027 -29.540 -27.652 -0.000 -0.000
Akaike Inf. Crit. 22.000 22.000 87.701 84.055 77.081 73.304 20.000 20.000
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix B
The following appendix hosts some more maps and tables which are useful for a
better understanding of the arguments brought about in the thesis.
Top 10 cities per Inventors’ number: all data
Birth
City All Humanities Science Inventors
London 110 76 27 7
Paris 177 125 46 6
Paisley 6 1 1 4
Plymouth 10 2 4 4
Preston 12 3 5 4
Braunschweig 10 2 5 3
Hannover 13 6 4 3
Bath 12 6 3 3
Edinburgh 27 9 15 3
Nottingham 10 4 3 3
Death
City All Humanities Science Inventors
Paris 414 275 117 22
London 203 118 65 20
Versailles 18 10 3 5
Berlin 76 35 37 4
Heidelberg 17 3 10 4
Muenchen 35 13 18 4
Nice 25 18 4 3
Firenze 57 49 5 3
Roma 84 62 19 3
s Gravenhage 12 5 4 3
Note: In absolute values
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Top 10 cities per Inventors’ number: 1600
Birth
City All Humanities Science Inventors
Paris 29 15 12 2
Napoli 6 3 2 1
Leiden 5 3 1 1
Dijon 3 1 1 1
Verona 3 1 1 1
Wroclaw (Breslau) 3 0 2 1
Provins 2 1 0 1
Versailles 2 1 0 1
Dublin 2 1 0 1
Bergamo 2 1 0 1
Death
City All Humanities Science Inventors
Paris 57 30 22 5
Roma 11 6 3 2
Muenchen 3 1 0 2
London 47 28 18 1
Napoli 10 5 4 1
Amsterdam 10 6 3 1
Venezia 9 5 3 1
Wroclaw (Breslau) 3 1 1 1
Bristol 3 2 0 1
Alencon 1 0 0 1
Note: In absolute values
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